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For over a century, while the English, French, and other Western 
European people had not yet organized their expeditions of discovery, the 
Spanish and Portuguese were establishing colonies in those lands which lie 
to the south of what was to become the United States. These colonies be-
came the hub of life in the New World. The language, religion, and customs 
of the mother countries left a rich cultural imprint, which design can be 
traced from the time of the conquistadores down to the present proud inheri-
tors of a glorious past. Everi after the advent of the :English, whose 
settlements continued to be crude and widely scattered over a sparsely popu-
lated territory for many years, the nations to the South were producing a 
distinctive culture, witnessing the growth 0f flourishing universities, and 
enjoying the creative genius of those who found their inspiration in the 
beauty and opportunity of a new world. 
Yet it was the Latin American countries which were to tum northward 
to the United States for encouragement and stimulation when engaged in theiz 
revolutionary struggles to establish governments based upon the ideals of 
liberty and freedom. They looked with admiration at the republican system 
already set in motion in the North, and endeavored to pattern their organi-
zations upon this model. The United States, interested in the struggles of 
neighboring countries to realize the ideals for which it had so recently 
suffered, and aware that concerted European action could offset the advance 
already gained, stated in the Monroe Doctrine that it would view with dis-
11 
pleasure the extension of European s,ystems in the Western hemisphere. 
In spite of the aversion of the United States to the political en-
croachment of Europe in Latin America, it was to do little or nothing in 
the ensuing years to prevent the economic penetration which European 
countries accomplished so successfully in the lands to the south. For ma.ny-
years the North .American manufacturer was absorbed in meeting the demands of 
the expanding home market, and it was difficult to obtain legislation which 
would forward trade with the Latin .American countries~ 
It is the purpose of this thesis to trace the early progress and 
growth of the trade of the United States with its Southern neighbors 1 
especially under the form of reciprocity trade agreements, which proved to 
be the most success.tul medium in effecting closer commercial union between. 
the Americas. Ne attempt has been made to discuss the recent reciprocity 
agreements of the last decade, as being beyond the scope of the present 
work, and a subject too broad to receive only partial treatment. We are 
concerned with the efforts of the United States to conSUJIIDla.te closer 
commercial ties with the Latin American countries previous to the year 1905. 
CHAP!ER I 
RECIPROCITY BEFORE 1880 
On June 12, 19.34, was passed in the Congress of the United States a 
law authorizing the President to make Reciprocity Trade Agreements with 
foreign nations, thus marking the beginning of a new era. in our trade 
rel.a.tions with the world in general and our Southern neighbors in parti-
cular.~ 
These agreements mark the fulfillment of a long cherished desire on 
the part of many statesmen to see North and South America become more 
closely knit in hemisphere solidarity by means of mtually beneficial 
economic intercourse;2 Factors which had hitherto prevented this commercial 
union were numerous, but the willingness of the United States in 19.34 to 
admit many of the products of her Ia.tin American neighbors into this countey 
without retaliatory tariffs designed to force reciprocity did liDlCh to combat 
a protective system which had made effective trade with Ia.tin America 
almost impossible;.3 
Although the Trade Agreements were made during a Democratic admin-
istration and the negotiations forwarded by a man who embodied that party~s 
1 Samuel F. Bemis, IB,! Ia.tin American Policy ,2! ~United States, 
New York, Harcourt Brace and Company, 194.3, 295. 
2 J. L, Laughlin and H. P •. ·willis, Reciprocitz, New York, The Baker 
and Taylor Company, 190.3, 116 ft • 
.3 Williams. Culbertson, Reciprocitz, New York, McGraw and Hill 
Book Com~, 19.37, 162. 
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ideal, reciprocity as a principle is not the exclusive property or either 
the Democrats or or their spokesman, Cordell Hul1.4 In fact, reciprocity 
itself has been defined by Webster as 
• • • that relation or policy as to trade or other 
interest between countries under which special 
advantages are granted by one side in consideration 
or special advantages granted by the other~5 
Laughlin and Willis quote several definitions, one or which reads: 
"Reciprocity in trade is an agreement made between two countries whereby 
they agree to make reciprocal or equivalent reductions in the duties on 
certain articles~n6 
Although the term reciprocity is easily defined, its practical mean-
ing and application have varied at different times in the history or our 
country~ The idea or reciprocity contained in the McKinley Tariff is a 
far cry from that understood in the trade agreements or the last decade~ 
Reciprocity as a method or tariff bargaining has undergone a slow method 
ot evolution during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and,as such, 
has contributed its share, diplomatic, economic, and political, to our 
country~ s history. 
Interest on the part of the United States in the affairs of South 
America was first manifested _officially when the people of that continent 
were endeavoring to win their freedom from Spain during the first quarter 
4 ~., 152. 
5 New International Dictionary of the English Language, 2d 
edition, 1939. 
6 Reciprocitz, 2. 
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of a centun-. The story of our sympathy with their efforts, our subsequent 
recognition of their governments and1finally,the utterance of the MOnroe 
Doctrine form a separate chapter of history • 
In 1825, on the occasion of our being invited to attend the Panama 
Congress instituted by Simon Bolivar, it is evident that the United States 
was interested in negotiating a commercial treaty with some of the Latin 
American countries~ In the instructions given by Henry Clay, then Secretary-
of State, to the United States delegates, this idea is made clear. 
Among the most important objects which are likely 
to engage the attention of the congress is that of 
endeavoring to fix some general principles of intercourse 
applicable to all the powers of America for the mtual 
regulation of their commerce and navigation. The 
United States from the origin of the present war have ••• 
uniformly proclaimed that the7 entertained no desire 
to procure for themselves from any of the new powers 
peculiar commercial advantages. TheY .. continue to 
adhere to this disinterested doctrine~ 
You will state in your conference that as they have 
not sought in treating with the American States 
separately, neither will they seek in joint negotiations 
with them for any privileges which are not equally 
extended to every one of them •• • • The President 
hopes that you will meet with corresponding dispositions 
in the other American States; and that you will have no 
difficulty in obtaining their ready concurrence to the 
equitable basis of perfect equality and reciprocity 
which you are hereby empowered at once to propo~~ for 
the commerce and navigation between all nations."f 
Clay~ s enlightened and farsighted commercial policy toward the Latin 
American countries is evident in his instructions regarding the general 
spirit which was to characterize our dealings with them. 
Experience at last teaches that, in every view, 
it is better to begin and to continue in the career of 
7 Histo:ry .2! :!ill.! International American Conference, Senate Evecutive 
Document, 232, Part 4, 52d Congress, lst Session, 129. 
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liberality than in that of a narrow and restricted 
policy, since the most that can be said against the 
former is that it only conducts to the same end without 1 
however 1 the unpleasant incidents to which the other 
finally and inevitably leads. There is a simplicity in 
the principle of reciprocal liberty of
8
navigation which 
confers on it a strong recommendation. 
John Quincy Adams, in a message to Congress reiterated the policy 
of his Secretary of State, when, after announcing the conclusion of a 
commercial treaty with Col.ombia and the hopes of future treaties with the 
other countries of Central and South America, he stated: 
The basis of them all, as proposed by the United 
States has been laid in two principles; the one of 
entire and unqualified reciprocity; the other, the 
:mntual obligation of the parties to place each other 
permanently upon the footing of the most favored 
nation;9 
It should be noted here that the recipr~ity understood by Clay and 
Adams was not so much in respect to tariff concessions as it was concern-
ing reciprocity in navigation. During the eighteenth century, there had 
been numerous regulations controlling the shipping, each country 8Bdeavor-
ing to control the trade with its colonies by requiring that trade to be 
carried in the ships of the mother country;10 At the conclusion of the 
American Revolution, Engll\nd had issued an Order in Council on July 2 1 178.3, 
putting American ships on a par with the :English as far as trade with the 
the mother country was concerned, although this stipulation did not apply 
to the American trade with the other British colonies which England still 
s ~., 1.32 
9 Message from the President, Dec. 61 1825, Senate Document I, 19th 
Congress, 1st Session, 5. 
10 laughlin and Willis, Reciprocity, 4. 
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"'11 hoped to reserve to herself • However, it marked the beginning of a move-
ment to liberalize navigation laws regarding shipping which both Adams and 
6lay desired to see carried out in their future trade agreements with the 
Latin American countries. 
However farsighted ma.y have been the policy of Adams and Clay in their 
endeavors to broaden the economic horizons of this country, their plans 
were thwarted by a hostile Congress, which, opposed to the President, was 
loath to give assent to any plan which would add to his prestige.12 
Another stumbling block to the cooperation of the United States with the 
Ranama Congress was that the consideration of "the means to be adopted for 
the entire abolition or the African slave trade" was on the agenda for 
discussion and naturally met with opposition from those members of Congress 
representing the South, as did the possibility that the condition or the 
islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, still belonging to Spain and still slave 
holding, might also be made a topic or discussion;13 
Finally, two delegates were appointed, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Sergeantf 
The former died on his way to Pana.na while the latter did not arrive until 
~14 
arter the last session of the Congress had been concluded. 
Thus, an opportunity to make an opening wedge in the trade and 
commerce of the Southern hemisphere was lost to the United States for 
11 Ibid. 
-
12 Frederick J. 'l'u.mer, ~ 2£ ~!!!!West, The American Nation 
Series, XIV, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1907, 284. 
13 Message of the President, Senate Executive Document, 112, 41st 
Congress, 2d Session, S. 
14 Historz 2!. ~International American Conference, Part 4, 136. 
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several generations but was eagerly seized by Ehgl.and;15 _This commercial 
ascendancy entrenched England in Central and South America and undoubte~ 
prolonged England~ s refusal to recognize the Monroe Doctrine in fact, or to 
acknowledge later our special interest in the securing of a trans-isthmian 
canal~ 
Although we had been sympathetic towards Mexico in her struggle for 
freedom, we were dilatory in appointing a minister to represent us officia 
in that country after her freedom from Spain had been won. The matter of a 
minister to Mexico became someth:ing of a political football from April:: 1822 
until March. 1825, when Joel R. Poinsett, the fourth man to receive the 
appointment, accepted it;16 Although the United States had been the first 
nation to recognize the new status of Mexico, its t&rdiness in opening 
negotiations with that country gave Ehgland a chance to forward her own 
interests,which she was not slow to do. When Poinsett arrived in Mexico 
bearing :instructions to make a treaty of amity and commerce with that 
country, he found that the English had preceded him and that a commercial 
treaty already negotiated with that country, had passed the lower house, 
and was about to be ratified by the Senate.17 
The history of the abortive treaty with Mexico in the 1820~s is one 
of protracted arguments and lengthy delays; Clay had instructed Poinsett 
to seek the incorporation of the principle of reciprocity as regards 
15 Message of the President, !2.£~ ill~ 
16 William R. Manning, Ear1y Diplomatic Relations Between The 
United States ~ Mexico, Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins Press, 191~44. 
17 ~., 49. 
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shipping in the treaty and the mtual enjoyment of special favors accorded 
h t . 18 any ot er na l.on. 
Both of these articles met with instant Qbjection from the Mexicans; 
the first on the ground that Mexico having no merchant marine would have to 
give more concessions than she received; the second on the basis that Mexico 
enjoyed certain relationships with her sister z:epublics that she could not 
be expected to share with any other nation; The United States was prepared 
to relinquish its stand on the question of reciprocity in favor of the most 
favored nation treatment if Mexico could not be persuaded to accept the idea 
of perfect reciprocity, but in regard to the second point, Poinsett remained 
19 firm and was supported by both Adams and Clay. Clay remonstrated that 
when Mexico wanted our assistance she had made capital use of the proximity 
and sjmilarity of institutions of the two nations; that the United States 
was not seeking special priv1.leges denied to others but that her position 
as a sister republic on the American continent should be recogniz ed by not 
refusing her privileges accorded the other American nations. 20 
At about this time in the negotiations, Mexico was the victim of one 
of those ministerial revolutions which have frequently caused upheavals in 
her internal and consequently her foreign affairs. Nor did it help matters 
~hat Poinsett was accused of complicity in provoking the revolution in order 
to secure cabinet members more favorable to the American cause:21 
18 American State Pa:eers, Foreign, V, 9081 VI, 578. 
19 American State Pa:eers, Foreign, VI, 582. 
20 ~· 
21 Manning, 48. 
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Mexico sought to bar the United States from full enjoyment of the commercial 
privileges granted to the Latin American nations, but Poinsett with govern-
mental support from home, remained firm. The Mexicans insisted upon the 
inclusion of a clause excepting all European Spaniards who had been 
naturalized in the United States since 1820 from enjoying the commercial 
~22 I 
privileges accorded the Americans. Since the acquisition of Florida in 
1819, it was greatly feared by the Mexicans that many Spaniards armed with 
American citizenship would hasten to claim their rights under the treaty 
but in reality to work to the detriment of the new republic. Although such 
restrictions were repugnant to the United States, they were finally conceded 
in return for the recognition of the equality of the commercial rights of 
the United States in respect to the other Latin American countries;
23 
The treaty was signed on July 10, 1826. Next followed the slow1 
tedious process of securing the ratification, especially from the Mexican 
Congress~ On March 12 of the following year, Mexico had not yet indicated 
her views on the treaty one way or another~ On February 12 Adams submitted 
the treaty to the Senate which approved it and offered only slight amend-
ments.24 
When the Mexican Chamber of Deputies finally offered a report on the 
treaty it was seen that the principal objection to it rested on the th~J-
third article which had caused no comment from the negotiators. This 
22 American State Papers, Foreipp, VI, 598. 
2.3 Ibid. 
-
24 Adams to the Senate, Feb. 12, 1827, American State Papers, Foreign 
VI, 578. 
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article provided that the Mexican state should endeavor to restore runaway 
slaves who had sought refuge within their borders to its. rightful owners, 
~25 
and that the United States would do the same regarding Mexican property. 
As Mexico had already freed her slaves and declared the institution ab-
horrent to her, she ref'u.aed to include this clause; The report read: 
The slave makes use of the inalienable right which 
the author of nature concedes to him1 when he pro-
cures his liberty. The chambers have shown them-
selves determine~ to erase this stain and to preserve 
our institutions~ It .is also to be observed that 
the reciprocity which is established in this article 
is nominal, since there are no slaves belonging to, 26 
Mexico on the frontiers of the States of the North. 
Poinsett regarded these sentiments as "Such are most likely to in-
fluence the young legislature of a young nation~ 1127 As the time for rati-
fying the treaty had expired, Poinsett • s first efforts were of no avail, 
but he was able to write three months later that President Victoria had 
invited him to a conference expressing his willingness to open negotiations 
once more regarding a treaty and inferred that the United States might 
,28 
experience less difficulty in gaining some of its points. One of the 
demands made by the Chamber of Deputies in its report was that the bounda.ry 
questions should be settled before the commercial treaty was considered~ 
Poinsett, realizing that the time was not ripe for the discussion of 
acquiring any portion of the desired land in Texas 1 acquiesced and the 
•. 2 
treaty was hastily negotiated and ratified by the two interested countries. 
25 For the text of treaty see ~· 1 VI, 6os. 
26 Manning, 231. 
27 Ibid., 244. 
28 ~., 232. 
29 For the treaty see American State Papers, Foreigg, VI, 946. 
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From that time on, negotiations moved a little more swiftly. Compromises 
were reached on several disputed issues, one of them being the principle of 
reciprocity which Mexico agreed to observe after a period of ten years, 
when she hoped to have a more substantial merchant marine, in the meantime 
granting to the United States the privileges of the most favored nation: 
Poinsett was able to write that all of the American stipulations had been 
incorporated into the treaty with the exception of the article regarding 
the time limit which :f.Iexico desired to have the same as in her treaty with 
England-twelve years instead of the six year limit desired by the Senate 
of the United States. The treaty was signed on February 14, 1828. 
Once more the treaty was sent to the Chamber of Deputies and once more 
they objected to the odious thirty-third article regarding the return of 
fugitive slaves. Poinsett reminded the Mexican government that the United 
States felt bound to protect the property of its citizens inasmuch ~s the 
slaves would be attracted to the free country of Mexico and if the Mexican 
government attempted to remunerate the owners each time that a slave escaped 
to its borders (the only alternative acceptable to the United States), it 
would be a source of constant conflict;30 Two weeks later Poinsett felt 
confident that if the Senate approved, he would have no difficulty in secur-
ing the agreement of the House upon reconsideration;31 
However, when the treaty reached the Senate, they not only objected 
,J2 
to the same articles as the House, but to twelve others as well. Poinsett 
30 Poinsett to Clay, March 8, l$281 MS., Department of State, 
Despatches from Mexico, II, cited by Ma.nning1 2U-42. 
31 Poinsett to Clay, June 41 1828, m., Department of State, 
Despatches from Mexico, IV, cited by Manning, 244. 
32 Manning, 245. 
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did not abandon hope, but thought that when the treaty wa.s retumed to the 
Chamber it might still be passed if it secured a. two-thirds majority in 
that body necessitating only a one-third vote in the Sena.te~33 But in 
spite of the fact that a specia1 session wa.s called by President Guerrero 
for the purpose of completing work on the treaty 1 internal events absorbed 
the attention of the Congress to the exclusion of all else. Added to this 
was the fact that the smoldering dislike and mistrust of Poinsett, who 
wa.s believed to have exercised undue influence upon Guerrero, finally burst 
into flame and forced Guerrero to ask for his recall. Thus ended, rather 
ingloriously, Poinsett~s attempt to negotiate a. commercial treaty with 
Mexico. 
His successor as minister to Mexico, Anthony Butler, acting under a 
new Mexican regime, wa.s able to negotiate a. commercial treaty which was 
signed on April 5, 1$31, and ratifications were exchanged one year later, 
the last day before the expiration of the time limit agreed to by both 
na.tions:34 This treaty embodied nearly all the points sought by Poinsett 
except that the offending thirty-third article referring to the restoration 
of runaway slaves wa.s entirely omitted, the "perfect reciprocityn agree-
ments would go into effect six years later instead of the ten years in 
Poinsettrs treaty, and the duration of the treaty was set at eight years 
instead of ten;35 This treaty of 18311 though limited :in scope, was to 
33 Poinsett to Clay, October 22, 1S281 MS., Department of State, 
Despatches from Mexico, IV, cited by Manning, 247. 
34 Nanning, 250. 
35 Treaties ~ Conventions Between ~ United States ~ other 
Powers, 177[;;1909, compiled by Wo M. Malloy under authority of the · 
government and published by the Government Printing Office, 19101 I, 688. 
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remain in force for over fifty years~ 
The next efforts of the United States to effect closer conmercia,~ 
relations with Mexico were tinged with the taint of land-hungry exp~oi.ters 
of the manifest destiny theory, who, not content with the cessions P.ined 
through the war with Mexico and the subsequent purchase negotiated bJr 
Gadsden, were still eager for more territon-~ The diplomatic endeavors of 
the Buchanan administration were devoted to efforts to acquire more 
Mexican territory or territorial concessions, and, in the latter part. of 
his term, to territorial concessions with the right of direct intervention. 
It was a period when fear of European intervention was at its height. (and 
later corroborated in the influx of the French :into Mexico), when the South 
especially sought to expand, and when business men, attracted by the 
commercial possibilities of an American controlled route of transit &.cross 
the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, brought pressure to bear upon the admini.stratio • 
Ironically, John Forsyth of Alabama, appointed to succeed Gadsden, 
was urged to allay Mexican suspicion in regard to territorial designs on 
the part of the United States, to achieve trade reciprocity, a postal con-
vention, and fair indemnities to adjust the American claims for depre-
dations committed along the frontier;.37 
A treaty concluded on February 10, 1857, provided for a loan by the 
United States to Mexico for the payment of the British convention debt 
(not provided for in Forsyth~s instructions), a postal convention, and a 
reciprocity treaty and commercial arrangement to open Mexican markets to 
.3$ James 1--1:. Callahan, "The Mexican Policy of Southern Leaders Under 
Buchanan~ s Administration 1 11 Annual Report ,2! ~ American Historical 
Association for 1 10 Washington, 1912, 1.35. 
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38 American manufactures. But Buchanan, loath to relinquish hope of furthe 
territory, decided not to submit the treaty to the Senate.39 
Buchanan at this time was very nmch under the influence or Judah P. 
Benjamin, a friend of his and attorney for the new Louisiana Tehuantepec 
company which was seeking control or any railroad which might be built 
across the isthnms. Benjamin, accompanied by the president of the com~, 
went to Mexico to view the situation, the latter being entrusted by 
Buchanan to present Forsyth with new instructions. In these, Forsyth was 
directed to ask for still more land--lower California, nearly all of 
Sonora, and part of Chihuahua north of thirty degrees, and right of way 
over~ ocean to ocean transit to be constructed in Mexico.4° Mexico 
declined to consider the subject. 
The presence or Benjamin, who boasted that "he carried the Buchanan 
administration in his pocket", did not help the prestige of Forsyth in 
Mexico, the latter being made to feel that fact both by the Mexicans and by 
/ Benjamin and his companion. 41 
In the meantime, the government which had refused to consider the 
American demands fell, and a new regime presided over by Zuloaga seemed 
more disposed towards a treaty. However, when the same territorial demands 
were made, Mexico once more refused to negotiate a treaty under such terms. 
Forsyth, in a demand unusual for one in his position to make, urged the 
38 ~-
39 ~., 137. 
40 ~· 
41 Ibid., 138. 
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'United States to employ force, saying that whatever they sought could be 
achieved in that way. 42 Fortunately, the United States evidenced no desire 
to achieve its aims by such undiplomatic means, and Forsyth resigned on 
February 7, 1859. 
Another Southerner, Robert M. Mclane, of Maryland, was appointed in 
his place. His treaty, too, proposed a sale or cession of land and grants 
of transits. Although the Mexican government was in desperate need of 
financial assistance which a treaty with the United States might remedy, 
yet the government was reluctant to grant any cession of land, a move 
which ran counter to the desires of the Mexican people. The United States 
was forced therefore to abandon any hope of adding to its territory already 
acquired; In the meantime, a Mexican agent was sent to the United States 
to see if he could secure a loan based on Mexican church property.43 
Failing to do so, the Juarez government was more or less forced ~o make a 
treaty on McLane~ s terms. The treaty gave privileges for which the United 
States was to pay $4,000,000; of this, $2,000,000 was to be paid upon the 
exchange of ratifications, and $2,000,000 was to be reserved by the 
United States for the payment of American claims against the Mexican 
government. The privileges granted to the United States were: 
1. Right of way under sovereignty of Mexico across 
the Isthnm.s of Tehuantepec, and also from the 
lower Rio Grande via Monterey to MazatJ.a.n and 
from Rancho de Nogales to Guaymas by any kind of 
road, together with a port of deposit at either 
terminus of the route and free and unrestricted 
passage of merchandise and of mail in ·closed bags 
· .across Tehuantepec. 
42 ~., 140. 
43 ~., 145. 
-.l;-
2. Right of the United States to transport troops, 
military stores and nnmitions of war over the 
Isthmus and from Guaymas to some suitable place 
on the boundary in the vicinity of Rancho de 
Nogales. 
3. Mexico should use her military force it necessary 
to protect persons and property passing over any 
of the route but that upon her failure to act, 
the American Government with the request and con-
sent of the Mexican Government 1 or of the Mexican 
minister at Washington, or of the competent and 
legallY appointed local authorities, might employ 
military force for the same purpose (but for no 
other). In case of imminent danger to the lives 
and property of American citizens the American 
Government was authorized to act for their pro-
tection without obtaining previous consent of 
Merlco.44 
The subsequent history of the McLane-Juarez treaty and its failure to 
secure ratification in the United States Senate illustrates the temper of 
the American political scene in those dangerous years immediatelY preceding 
the outbreak of hostilities between the North and the South in their con-
test for supremacy. Almost immediatelY it became an issue in party 
politics. In general, the North opposed the ratification of the treaty, 
while the South favored it, although there are notable exceptions to this 
statement. The North was of the opinion that the policy of the adminis-
tration with reference to Mexico was deliberately planned with a view to 
strengthening the slave power~45 F. P. Blair in a letter to J. J. 
Crittenden expressed the belief that "the whole scheme was one to secure 
\)46 
more territory for slavery. 
44 ~., 147. 
45 Howard L. Wilson, 11Buchanan ~ s Proposed Intervention in Mexico, 11 
~ American Historical Review, V, No. 41 ,JulY, 1900, 698. 
46 Ibid~ 
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A correspondent of !h! New ~ Tribune declared that the adminis-
tration aimed at the ultimate absorption of Mexico by the United States to 
offset, politically, the growing greatness of the West and to illustrate 
Calhoun's idea of equality in the Senate; that the slave section knew that 
the next census would reveal the comparative weakness of the South, and 1 
consequently, they had contrived a plot by which they could increase their 
population and territory; and that this was the inspiration of the whole 
scheme. He contmued to say that he thought the political game in the 
47 
treaty was the same as that played by President Polk. 
When the Mexican treaty first came up in the executive session of the 
Senate on February 28, 1860, it was violently opposed by both Senator 
~vigfall of Texas and Senator Simmons of Rhode Island~48 When it came up 
again in executive session on lvfa.y ~1, Mr. Simmons took the opposite ground 
to that which he had apparently held at the first session, and proposed a 
number of amendments to regulate the articles to be admitted free of duty 
in either country accordmg to the eighth article. Among these we find fr 
Mexico, tobacco, sugar, and wool. Mr. Hammond objected to the treaty on 
the ground that it would be equivalent to the practical annexation of 
Mexico and he could not see how the South would be benefited by it; ~1r. 
Seward was unwilling to commit the government to an important treaty with a 
faction in Mexico which might be immediately deposed by another 1 which 
wbUld repudiate the action of its predecessors and which would compel us 
47 ~ !2.!:!£ Tribune, Feb. 28, 1860. 
48 Eugene Schuyler, American Diplomacy and ~ Furtherance of 
Commerce, New York, c. Scribner and Sons, 188b,438. 
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even to surrender what had been acquired or probably to resort to war tor 
49 its enforcement. 
The McLane-Juarez treaty awakened great interest both in the United 
states and the leading countries or Europe especially in England, France 
and Spain: The English government was careful not to voice an official 
opinion, but the London Times expressed it approval. In Spain the govern-
ment disliked to see Mexico linking itself more closely to the United 
states and hoped that England would hinder the ratification of the treaty. 
Although the treaty was discussed in the French newspapers, the French 
government expressed no official opinion.50 In the United States the 
North was inclined to view anything attempted by Buchanan with suspicion~ 
A further cause or hesitation was the belief that our minister, McLane, 
had been instructed to give an indefinite promise of support to Juarez, 
who at the time was besieged in Vera Cruz, in return for which the 
Mexican ?resident was to be induced to sell to the United States certain 
Mexican provinces.51 Although these instructions, if given, were with-
drawn, the supposed attempt to secure more Southern territory cast a 
shadow over the reciprocity idea and aroused the hostility of the newly 
formed Republican or anti-slavery party. 
One interesting refutation to the accusation that.the South was 
aggressively seeking further territory is related in Dunbar's Mexican 
49 ~· 
50 Wilson, 700. 
51 Laughlin and Willis, Reciprocitz. 
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Papers where he quotes a conversation with a 11lead:ing senator from the 
South" who declares that the South recognizes that slavery cannot be 
carried west :into Mexican territory • He goes on to relate how when the 
South had their own man, Polk, in the White House and a Southern majority 
prevailed :in Congress, Calhoun had called Mexico "forbidden fruit." He 
declared, too, that Buchanan's efforts to get Sonora and Chihuahua had been 
the result of pressure from the California interests~52 
Despite these protestations, however, an analysis of the vote which 
killed the treaty clearly ev:inces a manifestation of sectional interests. 
The treaty was defeated by a vote of twenty-seven to eighteen. 53 Of the 
eighteen who voted for ratification, all were Democrats and fourteen were 
from the South. The negative vote numbered twenty-three northern and four 
. ··~ 
southern, twenty-one Republican and six Democratic Senators. 
The United States was not yet reaqy for reciprocity. 
In the stormy years which followed the Civil War, the United States 
was absorbed in setting to rights the affairs of its own household, but 
when the air began to clear after the smoke of battle had subsided, the 
business interests of the country began to seek broader fields of expansion. 
The Civil War had served as an impetus to the manufacturing interests of 
52 Edward E. Dunbar, The Mexican Papers, New York, J. A. H. Hasbrouk 
and Co., 1860, 15. 
53 U.S. GOvernment, Journal of the Executive Proceedings 2£ the 
Senate, .n, Dec. 6, 1858-Aug. 6, i'S61, 199. 
54 Fred Rippy, !.h!. United States !!'!!! Mexico, New York, 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1926, 226. 
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the North and paved the way for a new industrial period which was to follow. 
Individual merchants filtering down into Ia.tin America became increasingly 
aware of the rich markets open to the trade of the United States if that 
country would use the opportunities which awaited it. They also became 
more acutely conscious of the stronghold which the English possessed over 
south American trade by reason of their early start, government subsidies, 
numerous carrying vessels and the advantageous terms which they would offer 
to suit the peculiar needs of the countries with which they dealt. 
T his state of affairs was also noted by the ministers of the United 
States who repeatedly urged the State Department to take some action which 
would stimulate commerce with the Latin American countries. Excerpts from 
these reports along with a lengthy comment from Hamilton Fish, Secretary 
of State, found their way into the President 1 s Message to Congress in 1869. 
The report of Henry T. Blow, United States Minister to Brazil, is typical: 
n ••• four months• close observation here, with 
some experience in these matters • • • have long 
since impressed me with the view that we have 
shown an inexcusable indifference to this vast 
trade, which it would seem should belong to us 
entirely, while, with the exception of Cuba and 
one or two of the West Indian Islands, we do not 
enjoy any large share of it. In Rio I have sel-
dom seen our flag, and English and other foreign 55 houses do the bulk even of our own coffee busmess.n 
Hamilton Fish deplored our lack of commerce with the Latin American 
countries, and believed that the time was ripe for developing closer trade 
relations with them. He felt that the abolition of slavery had done much 
55 Message 2f. 1!!!. President, 41st Congress, 2d Session, 
Executive Document, 92, 6. 
to increase their sympathy and respect for the United States while it 
removed the fear of filibustering which the Southern desire for further 
• 56 terr1tory had engendered. 
During the next few years the United States ministers to the Latin 
American countries continued to urge the State Department to take some 
action which would materially assist the growth of closer commercial 
relations with their Southern neighbors. The ministers to Argentina, 
Chile, and Ecuador blamed the lack of adequate transportation facilities 
as the chief obstacle to trade with those countries, while scoring the 
excessive freight rates charged by the existing American Lines and the 
Pa.na.ma Railroad. 57 They also claimed that the cultural ties which bound 
the Latin countries to Europe rendered closer commercial relations with 
58 them more difficult on that account. 
Congress, however, was not ready to subsidize the steamship lines to 
the extent to which it had helped the railroads. In 18741 the Democrats 
captur~d the House of Representatives and held it for sixteen of the 
twenty-two years following, while the Republicans kept control of the 
Senate except for the brief period 1893-1895. With Congress thus divided, 
it was impossible to carry out any consistent program of legislation~ 
As agitation continued during the seventies and a treaty of trade and 
commerce with Mexico once more became a subject of discussion, the 
56 Message £! ~ President, 41st Congress, 2d Session, Senate 
Executive Document, 1121 S-11;. 
57 House Documents, Vol. 81 41st Congress, 3d Session, House 
Executive Document, 931 7-10. 
58 ~., 5. 
committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives investigated 
and reported on the feasibility of such a step. It was noted that an 
almost continuous state of revolution and anarchy had kept Mexico fram 
developing a flourishing commerce. As methods of agriculture continued 
primitive there seemed to be little market for the agricultural machinery 
of the United States nor would the natives have known how to repair it 
even if it were introduced.59 MOreover, in many instances .anti-Yankee 
prejudice was strong enough to ma.ke closer commercial intercourse diffi-
cult.60 The report emphasized that although Mexico imported much cotton 
goods, the United States could not expect much in the way of tariff 
exemptions because of local cotton goods manufacture in Mexico which it 
would seek to protect and because they would be unwilling to discriminate 
against England, France or Germany by giving the United States preferentia 
61 
tariff rates. The committee suggested that commerce would be greatly 
stimulated indirectly by government subsidy to steamship lines touching 
Mexican ports and by the building of railroads over the high plateau land 
leading to Mexico 6ity. 
Included in this report were the comments of Thomas H. Nelson, 
Minister to Mexico. He claimed that the low interest rate and long-
range credit supp~ed by European bankers offered encouragement to their 
merchants to indulge in foreign trade. He also stated that European 
59 "Report of Committee on Foreign Affairs, 11 House report 7011 
45th Congress, 2d session, xxxii. 
60 lli&· 
61 ~., xxxiii. 
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merchants catered to the Mexican taste in textiles, supplying the demand 
for cheaper goods of bright color rather than the more durable goods of 
62 
subdued color offered by the manufacturers of the United States. In 
his report he added that the chronic insecurity of life and property which 
existed in Mexico had a deterring effect upon the investment of foreign 
capital in that country and that the entire want of railroad and tele-
graphic communications along the fifteen hundred mile frontier separating 
the United States and Mexico was a. hindrance to closer commercial relations 
6.3 
between the two countries. 
The Connnittee also included in its report the views of Matias Romero, 
a. Mexican statesman, who was one of the most ardent advocates of closer 
relations between his country and the United States. He thought that 
reciprocity could be effected through the acceptance by the United States 
of Mexican sugar, free of duty, in exchange for some equivalent product 
of North American industry. He felt that such a reciprocity treaty would 
be quickly ratified because of the recent ratification of a similar, treaty 
64 by the United States with Hawaii. However, Mr. Romero overlooked the 
fact that most of the sugar interests in the Hawaiian Islands which had 
been back of a. treaty were even then North American and were destined to 
fight tariff privileges accorded any of their rivals. 
The years which intervened between 1825 and lSSO were witnesses of a 





gradual growth, though sometimes a feeble and anemic one, of an attitude 
which wa.s to include the Latin American countries as an integral part of 
the United States~ commercial system. Though sometimes halted by 
absorption in domestic problems or by conflicting interests, the trend 
toward southward commercial expansion gained momentum in the United States 
which ultimately was to result in definite steps taken to achieve the 
end desired. 
CHAP.rER II 
RECIPROCITY FROM 1880 to 1890 
Much of the legislation of the last twenty years has been the result 
of the slow growth and evolution of certain ideas first proposed in Con-
gress at varying times in the nineteenth century. The labor movement, 
women's rights, and more direct control of government by the people are only 
some of the outcomes of long, persistent effort on the part of those who, 
more farsighted than their contemporaries, saw the trends of the future and 
tried to prepare their own generations to face the issues at stake. 
While our nation was occupied in stretching itself across a continent 
there was little need to go searching for markets except as centers of 
exchange for those products not obtainable at home. Local demands kept 
the arteries of supply steadily flow:ing. With the exception of a few men 
there was general indifference to securing any part of the increasing Latin 
1 American trade. 
As industry began to grow it lobbied for higher tariffs to prevent 
the competition of cheaper foreign labor and to preserve its monopolies. 
But this was not an encouragement for trade to European or more especially 
1 Stephen A. Douglas, in a pamphlet 1 ~ American Continental Commer-
cial Union or Alliance, advocated "free trade, transit, and intercourse 
betWeen thelcrnited States and British possessions in the North, and Mexico, 
Cuba and Central American states." Elijah Ward also advocated the formation 
of a commercial union in America in his work, ! ~Continental System. 
to latin American countries who were able to effect very satisfactory trade 
agreements with the European countries and to receive special consideration 
with regard to types of merchandise and extension of credit~ 
The study of the history of the reciprocity movement with the countries 
to the south of us is comparable not to the erection of a modern skyscraper, 
which is accomplished with speed and dispatch, but rather to the slaw' 
building of the pyramids, block upon block. There is not a series of 
brilliant maneuvers which result in completed agreements, but rather the 
slow growth of a movement which was later stunted by our imperialistic 
tendencies and dollar diplomacy and was not to blossom until the emergence 
of the New Deal in the 1930's. 
The lSSO~s witnessed several interesting but abortive attempts to 
bring about closer commercial ties with our Southern neighbors. On 
January 21, lSSO, David Davis of Illinois introduced a bill which was 
designed "for the encouragement of closer commercial relationships between 
. the United States and the Republics of Mexico, Central America, the empire 
· of Brazil, and the several Republics of South America."2 It proposed the 
building of an inter-continental railroad as the best stinmlus to inter-
continental trade which would be initiated by a meeting of delegates from 
the countries concerned in Washington the following June. But the bill was 
tabled. Two years later the Cockrell-Morgan bill proposed almost the same 
legislation and met with a similar fate.3 
2 Senate Executive Document 232, 52nd Congress, 1st Session, Part IV, 
293-41 
3 ~., 294-95. 
In the meantime, other events were taking place in the Department of 
State which greatly affected the work of Congress. After Garfield's 
election it was only natural that the first position in the Cabinet would 
be given to his old friend, James G. Blaine, who, although he had had hopes 
of receiving the presidential nomination himself, had worked untiringly to 
elect Garfield. 
To the position of Secretary of State Blaine brought unusual qualities: 
Long years of experience in both the House and the Senate served as an 
admirable background. But the unique trait in Blaine which distinguished 
him from the Secretaries of State who had preceded him was that he entered 
upon his duties with a distinct and definite purpose.4 Instead of the 
negative process of waiting until some incident necessitated action he 
assumed a more positive stand and entered office with a specific program 
in mind: Under his leadership the United States adopted an aggressive 
American policy for the first time since the days of Seward. 5 
An integral part of Blaine's plan of action was the stimulation of 
Pan-Americanism. He was keenzy aware that Great Britain regarded South 
America as her sphere of influence both commercially and to some extent 
politically~ 6 This he felt was opposed to the best interests of the 
Americas, both North and South, and, during his two terms as Secretary of 
4 Edward Stanwood, James g. Blaine, 241. 
5 Alice Felt Tyler, !!!!.. Foreign Policy£!. James g. Blaine, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1927, 17. 
6 Charles E. Russell, Blaine 2,f Maine: ill:!,~~ Times, New 
York: Cosmopolitan Book Company, 1931, 381. 
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state, he never relaxed his endeavors to foist this viewpoint upon the 
't'sh 7 BrJ. J. • 
But his program was more positive in aspect than being merely anti-
British in tone. He entertained a vision of all the Americas united by 
8 
their common interests and republican forms of government. This idea of 
an American continental system is said by some to have been inspired by 
his study of Henry Clay• s speeches concerning Spanish American e:ma.ncipa-
tion.9 During his career in Congress he had been one of those who had 
attempted to interest the government in Latin American trade for, on June 5, 
1878, in a speech to Congress, he argued in favor of subsidizing United 
states merchant ships engaged in trade with South America. 
10 
There were two general principles underlying his policy: the first 
was the maintenance of peace through cooperation and arbitration between 
the various countries in the Western Hemisphere; the second, resulting 
from the first, was the steadily increasing conunercial development between 
11 
the states making up the system. 
In order to initiate this program, Blaine, with the consent of Garfiel 
on November 29, 1881, invited delegates from the latin American countries to 
7 ~· 
8 ~· 
9 William S. Robertson, Hispanic-American Relations mh, 2 
United States, New York: Oxford University Press, 192.3, .390. 
10 !2E·, 21.3-14. 
11 Tyler, !ill!, Foreign Policy of James Q. Blaine, 18. 
attend a conference to take place a year later in Washington. The late 
date was set purposely in the hope that the current quarrel between Peru, 
Bolivia, and Chile would be satisfactorily concluded by that time.12 
In his letter Blaine stated that the principal end of the congress 
was the prevention of future wars among the nations of America. He 
stressed the fact that the United States would enter the discussions on 
the same iiooting as the other countries represented there and that "it is 
far from the intent of. this Government to appear before the congress as 
in any sense the protector of its neighbors or the predestined and 
necessary arbitrator of their disputes."l3 
Apparently, the wording of the letter was carefully chosen with the 
idea o:t disarming latin American suspicion that we would seek to dominate 
the conference, yet there can be no doubt that Blaine considered the 
United States as the logical arbiter of South American disputes. In his 
instructions to Mr. Osbom, the American minister in Argentina, regarding 
the Argentina-chile boundary dispute, he wrote on June 1.31 1881, 11You 
should let it be distinctly seen that we do not seek the position of arbi-
tra.tor, but if the offer were made, our duty to. our sister republic of 
the distant South would forbid our declining it~ n14 
Blaine~ s action in the Costa Rica-Colombia boundary dispute makes 
this even clearer. Word ?a.me to our minister, Logan, that the question 
12 Senate Executive Document 2.32, Part IV, 257. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Tyler, ~ Foreir. Policy of James Q. Blaine, 52; quoting 
Foreign Relations, ~~ ~ 
was to be submitted to either the King of Belgium or the King of Spain or 
the President of Argentina for arbitration. The United States wrote we 
were interested in the territory under discussion (Panama) because of the 
Treaty of 1846. But our offer to serve as arbiters was haughtily refused. 
Our next step, a hint to the proposed arbiters that their interference 
would be unappreciated by the United States, was sufficient to make them 
decline the offer;15 
By M:l.rch of the following year Venezuela., Gu.atama.la., Brazil, and 
Salvador had accepted; Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia had promised to 
take the matter of the congress under consideration, while Costa Rica and 
Mexico awaited further developments.16 
The assassination of Garfield unexpectedly made Chester Arthur 
President of the United States. Although a Republican, Arthur was an 
opponent of the Blaine faction and it caused no special comment When the 
latter handed in his resignation as Secretary of State. Arthur •ppointed 
F. T • Freylinghuysen, a 'Stalwart~ but otherwise inconspicuous, in his 
place. 
M:l.ny claimed that besides possessing a concept of the Latin American 
countries and our relations with them entirely different from Blaine~s, 
Freylinghuysen also felt it his duty to discredit the work of Blaine with 
the hope of preventing him from becoming a formidable candidate for the 
presidency. in 1884.17 Whether true or not~ Freylinghuysen issued the 
15 ~., 79. 
16 Selli&te Executive Document 232, Part IV, 275. 
17 Russell, Blaine .2!, Maine, 388. 
following letter an Aug11st 9, 1S82, canceling the proposed conference: 
• • • that inasmuch as that peaceful condition of the 
South American Republics, which was contemplated as 
essential to a profitable and harmonious assembling 
of the congress, does not exist, and he (the President) 
having besides on the lSth day of April, 18821 sub-
mitted the proposition to Congress without evoking 
an expression of its view on the subject having been 
made by it for such a congress, he is constrained to 
postpone the projected meeting until some future date.lS 
That half the nations invited were preparing to send delegates and 
the adhesion of the others was assured, placed the United States in an· 
embarrassing position. 
Although Blaine was officially out of office 1 his ideas concerning 
hemisphere solidarity, especially economic, were not allowed to die. 
There were others who had caught his enthusiasm and who continued to 
present bills to Congress urging action of one type or another. The growth 
of business was beginning to create an interest in the possib!?-ties of 
trade with the countries of Latin America, but public opinion was not yet 
roused to the point that demanded specific legislation of Congress. 
In the lSSO•s a new treaty with Mexico was sought because the pass-
ing of the years had rendered the treaty of 1$31 inadequate. Even before 
the opening of railway communications, many had believed that the geo-
graphic and political relations between the United States and Mexico, as 
well as their commercial welfare 1 demanded mutual concessions in custom 
duties as a condition of improved trade. On January 29, 1876, Foster 
reported that Mexico approved the general policy of reciprocity and thought 
lS Senate Executive Document 232, 273. 
-Jl.-
the time was opportune :for the opening of negotiations on the subject.19 
On November 30, 1881, the Mexican minister at Washington tendered to 
Blaine a note denouncing the treaty of 1831. His successor, Freylinghuysen 
was anxious to preserve the treaty intact until the United States was 
ready to offer a new one to replace the old. He instructed our minister 
to furnish a memorandum of the Mexican objections to the treaty and sug-
gested that the provisions of the old treaty remain in force until a new 
,.20 
and improved one could be made. On April 5, 1882, the Senate passed a 
resolution authorizing the opening of negotiations for a commercial treaty 
21 
with J:!exico. 
A commission composed of General Grant and William H. Trescott from 
the United States, and M. Romero and A. Canedo representing Mexico, signed 
a treaty on January 20, 1883, providing for the entry into the United 
States, :free of duty, of twenty-eight articles of Mexican produce, includ-
ing among other things, coffee, unma.nufactured leaf tobacco and raw sugar • 
Seventy-three articles of American produce and manufacture were to be 
admitted free of duty into Mexico, including coal, petroleum, iron 
22 
machines and many manufactured articles • 
The treaty was to last six years. According to its provisions either 
country was :free to make those changes in its import duties as it :felt to 
19 James M •. Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations, 
New York: liJa.cmiJJan Company, 1932, 420. 
20 Ibid. 
-
21 Eugene Schuyler, American Diplomacy~ 2 Furtherance£! 
Commerce, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886, 439. 
22 ~., 440. 
be necessary and to offer the same concessions to other countries if it 
sa'\'1 fit. Hov~ever, if because of these changes either country wished to 
denounce the treaty before the termination of the six years, it would be 
23 free to do so. 
This treaty, after a long debate and several postponements, was 
finally approved by the American Senate on !•l"arch 11, 1884, and ratified by 
the Mexican Senate on May 18 of the same year without any change, and with 
authority to extend the time for the exchange of ratifications. 
However, the treaty had its opponents who hindered the passing of 
the legislation necessary to the enactment of the treaty. It was claimed 
that the free admission of Mexican sugar would ruin the United States• 
sugar industry because of the great potentialities of Mexico to raise 
sugar, that the number of articles was negligible, and that the reciprocit 
element gave greater advantages to Mexico than it did to the United 
24 States. 
Senator }furrill, one of the treaty's opponents, raised a question 
which was to be brought up again in the twentieth century, namely: Is a 
reciprocity agreement constitutional? Morrill t s argument was that the 
executive has no right under the Constitution to make reciprocity agree-
ments; that the right to levy tariffs is strictly the work of Congress.25 
23 ~., 441. 
24 11Mexican Treaty of Jan. 201 18831 11 Adverse Report, May 25, 18861 
House Report, 2615, 49th Congress, 1st Session, 1-5. 
25 I-l"orrill1 Justin s., !,;!J. Reciprocity Treaties, §.2 Called, Includ-
ing ~ !QJh Mexico, Unconstitutional, Remarks in the Senate of the 
United States, Jan. 7, 1885, Washington: 1884 fSicJ. 
That particular difficulty has been met in modem times by making 
the treaties of short duration and renewed only with the consent of 
Congress: 
Those who favored the treaty replied that we sold more refined sugar 
to Mexico than the unrefined product which we bought from her and that the 
volume of raw sugar exported from Mexico had been diminishing rather than 
. 26 increasing dur~g the past five years. Their report stated that the 
failure of the Mexican treaty would leave Mexico wide open to commercial 
conquest by England and Germany and that it repudiated the 1-lonroe Doctrine 
in fact if not in theory. 27 
Since the legislation necessary to make the treaty effective was not 
passed despite the extension of the time limit through diplomatic nego---
tiations, the treaty ceased to be operative on May 201 1SS7. 
Many in Mexico objected to the tone of the report which discouraged 
the treaty. Mr. Romero, minister to the United States, complained that 
nThe report of t.he majority seemed to be a libel against Mexico rather 
than a report • • 
Although the earlier openings of railways across the boundary frontier 
had stimulated a policy of reciprocity, the later establishment and multi-
plication of international railway communications, revolutionizing 
commercial conditions and giving the United States a great predominance 
26 House Report, 2615, 16. 
27 ~· 
2S Senate Executive Document, ~ Part I 1 Vol. 14, 222. 
in the trade of Mexico, largely supplanted the need of a reciprocity 
treaty which Romero, however, continued to advocate in 1889.29 
In the same year in which the negotiations for the commercial treaty 
with l~co were being conducted a series of bills were introduced in 
Congress which ultimately led to the first Inter American Conference: 
On February 8, 1883, :Mr. Cockrell of Missouri introduced a bill simi-
lar to that previously proposed by him for the appointment of a special 
commissioner to visit the several Republics of Central and South America: 
A similar bill was introduced at the same time in the House;30 Nothing 
was done, however, and at the beginning of the next session the same 
procedure was repeated. 
In the following year on March 3, 1884, Mr. Cockrell introduced in 
the Senate the following bill, which was the basis of an amendment added 
to the diplomatic and consular appropriation bill of that year, authorizing 
. . 
the appointment of a commission to visit Central and South America; 
A bill to authorize the appointment of three commissioners 
to visit the principal countries of Central and South 
America for the purpose of collecting information looking 
to the extension of American trade and commerce, and the 
strengthening of friendly and mutually advantageous relations 
between the United States and all the other American 
nationalities.Jl 
29 Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations, 421. · 
30 Senate Ex:ecutive Document 232, Part IV 1 297. 
31 ~., 298. 
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom the bill had been re-
ferred, recommended it favorably and further referred it to the Committee 
on Appropriations; The Committee included in its report a letter from 
the State Department in which Freylinghuysen reiterated his belief that 
the time was not yet ripe for an Inter American Conference, but in which 
he strongly recommended the making of a series of reciprocity treaties 
with the Latin American states.32 He went on to warn against indiscrim-
inate removal of tariffs on Lat:in American products without exacting a 
reciprocal removal of high tariffs on our products, for this would take 
from us the power to bargain. 
Removal of duties from coffee, without greatly cheapening its 
price, deprived us of the power to negotiate with the coffee-grow-
ing countries of Spanish America highly advantageous reciprocity 
treaties, and indiscriminate reduction of duties on sugar would 
complete our inability to establish favorable commercial relations 
with those countries which form our natural market, and from which 
we are now almost completely excluded. If we confine the reduction 
of duties on such articles as sugar and coffee to those Spanish 
American countries which are willing to negotiate with us treaties 
of reciprocity we cheapen these products for our own people and at 
the same time, gain the control of those markets for the products 
of our fields and factories.33 
The President appointed George H. Sharpe of New York, Solon o; 
Thacker of Ka.nsas, and Thomas c. Reynolds of Missouri, with William E. 
Curtis as secretary. This commission held conferences with the merchants 
and manufacturers of the United States in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, New Orleans, and San Francisco. Sharpe resigned in March of 
32 Ibid., 300-01. 
33 Ibid~ 
-
1SS51 and Curtis was appointed to succeed him. 
Upon the completion of its tour of observation the commission made 
a number of reports. In general, its findings could be classified under 
nine separate heads. 
1. Regular and direct steamship conmrunication. 
2. Commercial treaties with actual and equivalent reciprocal 
concessions in tariff duties. 
3. A simplification and modification of custom regulations 
in those countries. 
4. The increase and improvement of the consular service. 
5. The establisnment of American mercantile houses in Central 
and South American markets. 
6. A more intimate knowledge among American manufacturers of 
the wants of the people. 
7. A system of banking connections and a common standard of 
values. 
s. More liberal credits by our merchants. 
9. Introduction of the bonded warehouse system in these 
countries .34 
The problem of transportation was a fundamental one and one which 
seems to have been almost entirely neglected by the United States. Curtis 
enlarges upon this in his report. 
They (the latin American countries) offer and will pay subsidies 
to our ships. B razil now pays $100,000 a year as a subsidy to an 
American steam-ship line, while the United States Government paid 
only $4,000 J..a.st year to the same line for carrying our mails. The 
Argentine Republic had a law upon its statute-books representing a 
standing offer of a subsidy of 961 000 silver dollars a year to any 
company that will establish a steam-ship line between Buenos Aires 
34 House 2f Representatives Executive Document 226, 48th Congress 1 
2nd Session, 4. 
and New York under the American flag, and at the same time has 
twenty-one lines of steam-ships, sailing from forty-five to sixty vessels 
a month, bet~een Buenos Aires and the ports of Europe to which it 
pays nothing. We have no steam-ship communication with the 
Argentine Republic whatever.35 
Such shortsightedness on the part of the United States to grasp 
what was obviously an opportunity seems hardly credible today; 
The words "actual and equivalent reciprocal concessionsn were added 
to the report at the insistence of Mr. Reynolds who maintained that 
European nations which enjoyed "most favored na.tion11 privileges would 
claim the same exemptions without, however, having to meet any require-
menta. For ~ple, should the United States, resuming import duties on 
coffee, grant to Brazil freedom from them, on the "reciprocal concession" 
that flour and certain American manufactures should be admitted free into 
that empire, Great Britain, which consumed very little coffee of any kind1 
would claim the same freedom for her manufactures; Thus, in return for 
our purchase of Brazilian coffee to the amount of about $501 0001 000 
annually, Great Britain, offering no 11equivalent concession" in fact, 
would still be able to keep us out of the Brazilian market for those 
ma.nufactures.which she could supply more cheaply or with greater facility 
with her line of steamers.36 
Reynolds claimed that this was what had been done by Germany in Mexico 
Germany imported no sugar and little tobacco from ~~co, yet offered to 
remit her duties upon those articles, and claimed for her exports to that 
35 Senate Executive Document ~ Part IV, 364. 
36 ~., 350. 
Republic the same concessions which had been granted to the United 
37 States. 
Another item on the committee's list of suggestions for the improve-
ment of the trade with La.tin America was in the United States consular 
service. Too frequently the men appointed to these posts were obscure 
politicians, unfitted in education or sympathies for the tasks assigned 
them. It has been said that America was represented abroad at that period 
by 11a corps of consular agents, of whom the kindest thing that might be 
said was that the best of them were men of letters {like William Dean 
Howells) though the generality were obscure political hacks~n3S 
Until 1906 the .American consular service was operating under a code 
of laws written in lS56. The inefficiency of the general run of agents is 
best illustrated by the fact that President MCKinley, when foreign trade 
in manufactured goods was becoming an important item, removed 23S out of 
39 272 members of the consular service. But the needed changes in the 
system did not come until the early years of the twentieth century; 
In spite of the work of the commission nothing was actually under-
taken as a result of its report. Its recommendations and suggestions 
went unheeded. The period from 1SS4 to 18SS saw a Democratic president 
and House but a Republican Senate in control of affairs,.which had the 
effect of stalemating all legislation with the exception of a few bills 
of a nonpartisan character. 
37 ~· 
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The spring of 1886 saw a number of bills introduced which had as their 
end the closer affiliation with Latin America, and are significant in that 
they show an increasing interest on the part of Congress in the matter. 
On January 26, 1886, Mr. Worthington introduced a joint resolution 
in the House of Representatives which had as its object the authorization 
of the President to invite delegates to attend an international American 
congress to arrange for the arbitration of all national differences.40 
lvfr. H. R. Helper~s bill of February 8 differed in that it sought the dis-
cussion of an international railroad at the proposed meeting~4l Both 
bills were adversely reported and indefinitely postponed. 
On February 23 Senator Frye of Maine proposed a detailed and specific 
bill calling for a congress to meet on October 1, 1887~ He suggested that 
each nation send as many delegates as desired but that each nation should 
have only one vote. A seven point program was also outlined for the 
consideration of the delegates.42 In reporting on this bill the Committee 
on Foreign Relations dwelt at length on the desirability of obtaining the 
Latin American market for the cotton goods of the United States. It 
pointed out that the consumption of cotton goods by these countries 
amounted to $100,000,000 annually and that England furnished about ninety-
five per cent of this amount:43 As cotton constituted the wearing apparel 
of nearly three-fourths o~ the population of these countries and had to be 
40 Senate Executive Document 232, Part IV, 310 
41 ~., 3ll. 
42 ~., 312. 
43 Ibid., 317. 
imported, it was not an unimportant item. mgland was aided by cheap 
transportation facilities and by the fact that the manufacturers catered 
especially to the wants and tastes of their consumers in latin America. 
The report stated that while the freight from Liverpool, Hamburg, and 
Bordeaux remained fifteen dollars a ton and that from the United States 
continued at totty dollars a ton, the latin American countries would 
continue to buy from Europe. 44 
Although the matter was a subject of frequent discussion in both 
houses of Congress in 1886 and 1887, it was not until May 10, l8BB, that 
a bill was finally passed authorizing the President to invite delegates to 
an Inter American Conference~45 
In the invitation issued by Secretary of State Bayard, an eight point 
program of discussion was outlined. 
1: Measures to pre~erve and promote the prosperity of the 
American States. 
2~ An American Customs Union. 
3. Transportation and commtUlication. 
4. Unttorm. customs and port regulations; 
5: Uniform weights and measures, laws of copyrights, patents, 
extradition of criminals. · 
6. Adoption of a common silver coin. 
7. A plan for the arbitration of all disputes. 
B. Any other subjects relating to the welfare of the several 
states which might be introduced.46 
44 ~-
45 ~., 375. 
46 Tyler, The Foreign Policy of James Q. Blaine, 176. 
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By the time that the congress was to open in October of 18$9, 
Harrison and the Republicans were once more in power and Blaine had the 
pleasure of conducting the sessions. 
The discussions of the Conference extended over many weeks~ Interest 
centered chiefly in the project for international arbitration; There 
were many differences of opinion about this among the delegates.47 In 
order to reconcile the discordant views, Blaine himself drafted an arbi-
tration plan. On April lS, 1S90, a project for international arbitration 
was approved. That project provided that arbitration should be adopted 
by the .American nations 11as a principle of American international law" 
for the solution of disputes among themselves or between them and other 
powers. ArbiPration should be obligatory in all controversies except 
those which, in the opinion of one of the nations involved in the con-
troversy, compromised her independence.4S At the conclusion of the Con-
ference the nations participating did not carry out the recommendation to 
adopt treaties modeled upon this plan, however, and the resolution 
remained ineffective: 
Nor did Blaine succeed in establishing an American customs union 
for reciprocity in trade. The majority opinion of the committee in charge 
recommended that reciprocity in America should be approached graduallY 
47 Robertson, Hispanic-American Relations With ~ United States, 393. 
4S international American Conference, II, Government Printing 
Office, lOSO. 
by the negotiation of "partial reciprocity treaties among the American 
nationa,.u49 It recommended the making of individual treaties among 
the various states rather than binding all to set rates in duties on 
imports or exports. 
The most notable accomplishment of the Conference was the establish-
ment of an information bureau supported by all the American Republics. 
This was set up in Washington,. Known at first as the International 
Union of American Republics, it today functions under the name of Pan-
American Union, and has its headquarters in a building donated by 
Andrew Carnegie. Besides possessing a rich library of Hispanic-Americana, 
it publishes a monthly bulletin and numerous other materials regarding 
the American Republics. 
Criticism of the First Conference, because few of its professed 
objects were immediately accomplished, was not lacking either in North 
or South America; but even the most bitter critics were forced to 
admit the profound moral effect on South America of a gathering in which 
all the American states sat with equal rights regardless of size or 
50 power. The convocation, for the first time in the history of the 
world, of the representatives of the independent nations of a hemis-
phere was highly significant. The head of the Mexican delegation, 
~tlnister Romero, declared that the most important result of the First 
49 Ibid., I, 104-05 
50 Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, III: 19, 
November 25, 1927, 277. 
International Conference was 11t}\e sentiment of mutual respect and con-
. 51 
sideration which was spread among its delegates.n 
The dispute between the United States and Chile, which broke out 
over the Itata and Baltimore incidents immediately after the adjourn-
ment, largely counteracted the enhanced prestige with which the United 
States had emerged from the Conference. Later, the war between the 
United States and Spain and the manifestation of ~Yankee Imperialism~ 
was not without its effects in increasing Latin American suspicion of 
the United States. 
President Cleveland had been defeated in 1888 presumably on the 
question of the tariff. That the Republicans should believe that they 
had a mandate from the American people to formulate a tariff which 
would embody all the protective tendencies characteristic of their 
party was only natural. This ~s done in the McKinley Tariff of 1890. 
Besides including duties on manufactured articles, the tariff 
attempted to pacify the farmer by add:ing food stuffs to the list and 
to earn the support of the workingman by the "free breakfast tablen; 
that is, the exemption of coffee, sugar and molasses from the payment 
52 
of duty. The sugar growers, in return, would receive a bounty on the 
domestic product. 
51 M. Romero, 11 Pan American Conference, 11 .North American Review, 
cu, 413. 
52 Williams. Culbertson, Reciprocity, New York: l.fcGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1937, 154. 
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Blaine objected at once. It was not the high tariff nor even 
the free goods to which he took exception but the manner in which they 
were made free. In a letter to the mayor of his home town of Augusta, 
].fa.ine, Blaine endeavored to make his point of view clear to others. 
You are in error in supposing that I am opposed to sugar 
being admitted free of duty. ~~objection is not to free 
sugar but to the proposed method of making it free. If, in 
the pending tariff, sugar is placed on the free list, we give to 
certain countries a free market for $95,000,000 of their pro-
ducts, while they are not asked to open their markets to the 
free admission of a single dollar of American products. We 
ought to have, in exchange for free sugar from certain 
countries, a free market for breadstuffs and provisions, be-
sides various fabrics from all parts of our country. • •• It 
will not require reciprocity treaties to secure this great 
boon. The tariff bill can contain all the necessary conditions. 
The legislative power is able to secure the desired end.53 
During the discussions on the tariff Blaine appeared before the 
Republican members of the Committee on Ways and l~ans and tried to per-
suade them to adopt his idea of reciprocity and to incorporate it in 
the tariff • His suggested amendment was rejected, however, as McKinley 
was the only one to vote for it. 54 When the tariff was turned over to 
the Senate Committee on Finance, there was still no effort made to 
insert the barbaining principle. 
Finally Blaine wrote to Harrison in an effort to secure presi-
dential support for an idea which he felt was absolutely essential if 
53 Stanwood, James Q. Blaine, 279. 
54 Culbertson, Reciprocity, 154. 
we were to secure any of the vast Latin American trade for ourselves. 
He dwelt upon the one-sided character of the trade with Latin America, 
and the insignificant amount of North American products which found their 
way into those countries. He called the attention of the President to 
the fact that of $300,0001 000 worth of breadstuffs, provisions, petro-
lewn, and lumber which we exported annually, only $15,0001 000 worth of 
it was sold to our Southern neighbors.55 By extending the privilege 
of no duty on sugar, coffee, tea, and hides only to those countries 
which were willing to reciprocate in the purchase of American products 
and manufactures, Blaine felt it would do much to remedy the inequalities 
56 
of the ratio of our exports and imports to those countriefi. 
President Harrison • s reply was to send a personal message to 
. . 57 
Congress enclosing the letter of Blaine. For the executive depart-
ment to intervene publicly and officially to obtain an amendment to a 
bill in its progress through Congress was undoubtedly a most unusual if 
not unprecedented act. The omission by the President of an endorsement 
of Blaine's specific proposition may fairly be ascribed to his unwill-
ingness to create a bad precedent, and possibly the rule was not violated 
by his transmissiOn of the letter containing the suggestion. 
Blaine himself was much in earnest with his plan to use the 
tariff to extend the foreign trade. On July 11, when the debate in the 
55 Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st Session, 6256-59. 
56~-
57 Ibid. 
Senate was about to begin, he addressed a letter to his friend, Mr. Frye 
of V.~aine, in which he said: 
The charge against the protective policy which has injured 
it most is that its benefits go wholly to the manufacturer 
and the capitalist and not at all to the farmer. • •• Here 
is an opportunity where the farmer may be benefited-primarily, 
undeniably, richly benefited. Here is an opportunity for a 
Republican Congress to open the markets of forty millions of 
people to the products of American farms. • • • 
I do not doubt that in many respects the tariff bill pend-
ing in the Senate is a just measure, and that most of its pro-
visions are in accordance with the wise policy of protection. 
But there is not a section or a line in the entire bill that 
will open the market for another bushel of wheat or another 
barrel of pork.58 , 
The Democrats opposed the amendment on the grounds that it took 
tariff-levying powers from Congress and gave them to the Executive.59 
This argument is the chief weapon of those who oppose the principle of 
reciprocity. It was used in the nineteenth century by the Democrats 
against an amendment to a highly protective tariff, while it became the 
rallying cry of the Republicans in the twentieth century when a Democratic 
administration sought to use it in effecting better commercial relations 
with the latin American countries~ 
It has been suggested that an additional motive with Blaine and 
his supporters was the desire to gain some general authority which would 
enable the administration to carry on a vigorous reciprocity policy 
58 Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies ~ the Nineteenth 
Century, II, New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1904, 278. 
59 Stanwood, James Q. Blaine, 283. 
unhampered by the necessity of constantly submitting treaties to 
60 
Congress. As has been seen, this submitting of treaties usuallY 
resulted in prolonged delays, even when they were favorably regarded 
both at home and abroad, while the hands of the negotiators were some-
times tied by ignorance concerning the attitude which would be taken 
toward certain proposed concessions. Frequently the work of the nego-
tiators came to nothing in consequence of unexpected antagonisms in 
Congress, resulting in ultimate defeat of the treaties. 
Another motive underlying the reciprocity proposal was undoubt-
edly that of politics. "The trend of public opinion on the tariff bill 
while it was under discussion in the House, made some of the Republican 
leaders uneasy as to its effects on the Barty prospect in the West; and 
this feeling was strong with Mr. Blaine, not the least shrewd of the 
61 
Republican leaders. 11 By inserting the reciprocity clause there was 
the possibility that the farmer could be led to believe that something 
was to be, done for him, and thus to make less distasteful the higher 
. ~ 
duties on imported manufactured goods consumed by him. 
' 
One of the most revealing sources of information concerning the 
reciprocity clause is the correspondence of President Harrison and his 
Secretary of State throughout the period when it was being discussed 
60 laughlin and Willis, Reciprocity, 184. 
61 F. W. Taussig, ~ Tariff Histo;cy ~ the United States, New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1896, 278. 
62 Laughlin and Willis, Reciprocitz, 185. 
:in Congress. The following excerpts are interesting because of their 
intimate revelation of both motive and method: 
Harrison to Blaine: 
July 17, 1890 
• • • I have been thinking over the sugar question and 
have a suggestion to offer. When I get it tested at the 
Treasury Department I will send it to you for your opinion. 
Things have gone so far that I do not think we can avoid 
free sugar, but if my plan will stand criticism, as I be-
lieve it will, we can still hold the string in our hands. 
I am in negotiations for reciprocity.63 
Blaine to Harrison: 
July 19, 1890 
M9.y I hope that you will not consent to the throwing 
away of a hundred millions of sugar with nothing in return. 
I think the mistake would be deplorable & an infinite in-
jury to the Party • I want you first & last to keep yourself & 
your Administration free from mistakes and especially from 
gigantic blunders.64 
Blaine to Harrison: 
July 21, 1890 
It will be a great thing if you can "hold the string11 in 
your own hands on the Sugar matter. Keep~ string out 
until ~. l:L.21, and I think we can do something that will 
help the country & strengthen your Administration incalcul-
ably. The one really involves the other & I am interested 
in both in the order named. I know you are in exactly the 
same position. 
We can turn a peril into a great triumph--and the credit 
will go wgere it ought to and where it justly belongs--to 
yourself. 5 
63 Albert T. Volwiler, ed., Correspondence Between Benjamin 
Harrison and James Q. Blaine, 1882-1893, fuiladelphia: American 
Philosophical Society, 1940, 109. 
64 Ibid., llO. 65 Ibid. 
Blaine to Harrison: 
July 22' 1890 
We must not lose control of the Sugar question. It will 
be a bad political blow if the Bill passes in its present 
shape. But if it be passed so that the tax shall on Dec. 1/91 
be levied anew on all countries that shall not meanwhile have 
made satisfactory treaties of reciprod.ty, the triumph will be 
immense; I hope you will not permit it to pass in any other 
shape.66 
Harrison to Blaine: 
July 23, 1890 
As to "Free Sugar, 11 I said to you in a recent letter that 
I had concluded from a very general inquiry among Senators 
and Iviembers that sugar would have to go on the free list. 
It is too late to turn the current which has set in that 
direction. But I believe we can manage to hold the advantage 
of it in our reciprocity--negotiations by inserting a proviso 
that if within a year the States or Colonies from which we 
derive sugar shall not by this law or by treaty give us 
reciprocal advantages a duty shall go upon sugar from such 
States. I have asked Mr. Windom to see what he can do in 
preparing such an a.m.en~ent, which it is my purpose to send 
to you for suggestions. 7 
Blaine to Harrison: 
July 24, 1890 
I think it would be a mistake to make Agricultural products 
the ~ basis for reciprocity on the Sugar question. 
With some countries they would furnish the best basis. With 
others I think fabrics would be better. The Spanish islands 
would I think take far.m products. In Mexico manufactures would 
be better. I think we ought to have the privilege of using both--
giving preference to farm products--but if we limit the articles 
to the farm we shall not get nearly so large a basis of reciprocity 
for the $1001 000,000 of Sugar we take from them. • • • I am 
profoundly convinced that it will prove a fatal blunder not to 
make a serious effort for Reciprocal trade.68 
66 ~., 111. 
68 ~., 113. 
67 ~., ll2. 
After Harrison 1s message and the enclosed letter from Blaine 
were read, :!Yfr. Hale of Maine offered the following amendment to the 
pending tariff. 
And the President of the United States is hereby authorized 
• • • to declare the ports of the United States free and open 
to all the products of any nation of the American hemisphere 
upon which no export duties are imposed • • • as long as such69 nation shall admit to its ports • •• flour, com-meal, etc. 
The italics have been inserted to emphasize the broad scope of 
the reciprocity intended in this amendment. In a speech on June 29, 
1894, Senator Hale stated that the amendment had been drawn up by 
70 
Blaine. 
If the amendment had been passed as written it would have 
included wool, which was certain to have brought immediate protest from 
the Western sheep raiser; therefore,the Hale amendment received but 
little notice. 
Almost immediately another amendment was offered in which the 
articles put on the free list were left there,but the President was 
authorized to impose penalty duties on a number of them {sugar, molasses, 
coffee, tea, and hides) Whenever he found that countries producing and 
exporting these articles to the United States imposed duties on our 
71 products which he deemed to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable. 
This amendment finally passed and became part of the McKinley Tariff 
Bill of 1890. 
69 Laughlin, Reciprocity, 191. 
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As the first instance of the employment of the reciprocity 
principle in our dealing with the Latin. American countries, this bill 
has been widely heralded. It marked the recognition by the Goverrunent 
of a growing need of wider markets for the produce and manufactures of 
the United States. A point which is often overlooked, however, is the 
decided retaliatory feature of the reciprocity agreement in its final 
form. There was no consideration given to the needs of Latin America 
for longer term credits, special types of merchandise or the erstwhile 
problem of transportation. On the other hand, they were asked only to 
remove tariff barriers on our products in return for the removal of 
our tariffs on theirs. 
However, the bill was at least an opening wedge in the trade of 
the United States with Latin America, and a partial fulfillment of the 
dreams of those who envisioned the two Americas closely united through 
commercial ties. 
CHAPI'ER III 
RECiffiOCITY FROM 18<)0 TO 1900 
The passage of the McKinley Tariff in 18<)0 marked the first 
practical application of the principle of reciprocity in dealing with the 
Latin American countries. It was an experiment which was nru.ch criticized 
by the Democrats at the time, and passed the Senate by a vote of only 
'-1 thirty-three to twenty-seven. The tariff definitely reflected the 
spirit of the age (and of the political party) which produced it. During 
the 1890's the trusts reached the zenith of their power with a correspond-
. 
ingly heightened demand on the part of the Western miner and farmer that 
something be done to enable them to share in the profits which industry was 
enjoying. Even Blaine admitted that the HcKinley Tariff, before his reci-
procity amendment had been added, would not enable the farmers to sell an 
extra barrel of flour nor pound of pork, and he used this argument to in-
duce Congress to incorporate his reciprocity policy in the tariff.2 
Later on attention was riveted on the silver question which forced 
itself on the country~s notice by the accumulation of vast stores of 
silver in the Treasury~s vaults as a result of the Sherman Silver-Purchase 
Act of 1890. The surplus of silver had the tendency to lower its value 
with attending evil results. By the middle of the decade the tariff 
l ~ ~ TilEs, Oct. 1, 1890. 
2 Laughlin and Willis, Reciprocity, 188. 
as an issue was superseded in inportance by the silver and gold contro-
versy but in 1890 it was thought that the tariff bore the chief re-
sponsibility for increasing or decreasing the national prosperity. 
November 1890 was the time set for the mid-term elections of 
Senators and Representatives. During the month between the passing of 
the tariff on October first and the date for the elections there ensued 
a lively contest between the country's two main political parties for 
the control of Congress. The tariff became the issue by which the Demo-
crats hoped to dislodge their opponents a.nd the Republicans to vindicate 
their actions. Through a barrage of clever propaganda the Democrats 
spread the belief that a sharp rise in prices would follow the enactment 
of the tariff • Success was relatively easy for the increase of duty on 
certain articles of daily consumption was distinctly perceptible in the 
retail price. 
Armour declared that the cost of the tin used in his meat-packing 
3 
plants had increased by $250,000. In a.n interviel'T, Hr. I. \v. Iviorton, 
Vice President of the Simmons Hardware Company, which was the largest 
single hardware company in the United States, affirmed his belief that 
the tariff was unnecessarily high and would cause an increase of fifty 
per cent in pocket cutlery alone.4 The newspapers opposed to the 
tariff reminded the farmer that the short crop would force him to pay 
5 high duties on imported seed, peas, and potatoes. Earlier papers had 
.3 New York Times, Oct. 14, 1890. 
4 ~., Oct. 17, 1890. 
5 Ibid., Oct. 6, 1890. 
already warned the farmer that while $45,0001 000 out of $356,0001 000 
of his goods might be protected in the new tariff, $311,0001 000 of his 
goods would have to compete against foreign produce in addition to 
$1051 0001 000 increase in tariff duties on consumer goods which he must 
6 buy. Merchants had previously created a buying boom by warning their 
customers of the expected increase in prices and urging them to buy 
before the rise became effective.7 It was even claimed that peddlers 
were outfitted to sell their wares at prohibitive prices in the back 
country, charging that the tariff had brought about the steep incline 
in the cost of their goods.8 
As the time of the elections drew near, the Democrats noted with 
evident satisfaction that the Republicans were spending large sums of 
money in a special effort to have !~Kinley, the sponsor of the tariff, 
re-elected. 9 Many believed that his re-election and that of Reed would 
10 
do much to boost the chances of the Republican party. It was money 
wasted, however, as public opinion made itself felt in a decisive and 
forceful manner in the November elections. The Republicans suffered 
the worst defeat in the history of their party. They lost more than 
one-half of their strength in the House, giving to the Democrats a 
6 Chicago Times, April 19, 1890. 
7 ~~Times, Oct. 5, 1$90 
S Ibid. 
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majority of almost three-fourths in that body. The sixteen Southern 
States chose but three Republicans out of one hundred twenty-one return-
ing Representatives, While even the New England states elected a majority 
12 
of Democrats. Altogether, the Democrats were victorious in securing 
235 places in Congress to BB filled by the Republica.ns.13 However, the 
Republicans carried the six vlestern states "recently admitted in the 
expectation that they would add six Representatives, a. dozen Senators, 
and eighteen electoral votes to the Republican strength, and this com-
pensa.ted sanewha.t for the loss of the Southern Negro vote. 11 14 
Despite the defeat of the Republicans and the obnoxious tariff at 
the polls, the latter continued to remain in action even if its makers 
15 did not. This tariff differed from earlier ones not only in its 
unique reciprocity clause but in the bounty it granted to sugar growers 
in the United States. This was a. compromise move to satisfy the sugar 
trust, which sought the free admission of raw and unrefined sugars, and th 
domestic beet, cane, and sorghum raisers who in turn wished to have their 
products protected. The tariff provided for the free admission of raw 
sugar, paid a bounty to the raisers of domestic sugars, and continued a 
11 Edward Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 274. 
12 ~· 
13 Wilfred E. Binkley, American Political Parties, New York, 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1943, 324. 
15 MCKinley was defeated for re-election in his ow.n district. 
16 
high rate of duty on imported refined sugar. 
Soon after the tariff became a law, the constitutionality of some 
of its provisions was challenged. The opponents of reciprocity claimed 
that section three of the MCKinley Act violated the Constitution by 
conferring legislative powers upon the President. Several cases in which 
substantially the same points were raised were brought to the Federal 
Supreme Court. In Fields vs. Clark which came from the Circuit Court 
of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, and in Boyd 
vs. United States and Sternbach vs. United States, which came from the 
Federal Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, it was 
charged that the reciprocity provision of the recent tariff was a viola-
tion of the Constitution and therefore not mandatory.17 In its decision 
the Supreme Court ruled that 
Congress cannot delegate legislative powers to the 
President. • • • The act of October 1, 1890, in the 
particular under consideration is not inconsistent with that 
principle. It does not in any real sense invest the Presi-
dent with the power of legislation. • • • Congress itself 
prescribed in advance, the duties to be levied, collected, 
and paid on sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides ,...Pro-
duced by or exported from such designated country Lo~e which 
would not allow reciprocal reductions on our producty while 
the suspension lasted.l8 
The Court also held that the "constitutionality of the McKinley Act 
was entirely in harmony with many precedents to be drawn from our 
16 Ida M. Tarbell, ~Nationalizing of Business, 1878-~ 
A History· of American Life Series, IX, New York, The Ilffacmillan Company 1 
1936, 196. 
17 Laughlin and Willis, Reciprocitz, 207. 
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' 19 diplomatic and executive history." 
Reciprocity in the }~Kinley Tariff centered around what came to be 
known as "the tropical products" of tea, coffee, sugar, molasses, and 
hides. None of these offered competition in any way to the products of 
the United States. Tea and coffee were not produced at all, sugar and 
molasses only in small quantities, and while hides were produced in 
20 large amounts the supply was inadequate to meet the demand. The most 
valuable article on the list was sugar. Besides being one of the staple 
i't.ems of export from many of the latin American countries, beet sugar was 
raised in several European countries. The European sugar industry at 
this time, however, was in a very depressed condition, and prospects for 
the immediate future were not promising. In practically all the countries 
which raised sugar beets in large quantities the industry had been greatly 
21 
over-stimulated by high import duties and large export bounties. As a 
result of sustained over-production, prices were at a very low level~ The 
free admission of sugar by the United States, the world~s leading sugar 
importer, was an advantage for which it was thought that the sugar-produc-
ing countries would be willing to offer tariff concessions of consider-
22 
able value to the United States export trade. 
Shortly after the enactment of the tariff law of 1890, :Mr. Blaine, 
19 ~· 
20 U • S. Tariff Connni.ssion, Reciprocity ~ Connnercial Treaties, 
Washi.."1gton, Government Printing Office, 1919, 150. 
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Secretary of State, wrote to the diplomatic representatives residing at 
washington of those countries which produced the so-called "tropical 
products" to inform them of the newly-passed law and to invite their 
trade.23 The reply of the Vdnister from Brazil was received on January 31, 
18911 Brazil being the first country to respond to our invitation. The 
~finister stated that Brazil had by legal enactment, authorized the entry 
into its ports free of duty certain specified articles and had provided · 
for the entry of other articles at a reduction of twenty-five per cent of 
the usual prescribed tariff duty:24 On Februar.r 5, 1891 President 
Harrison proclaimed the reciprocity agreement made with Brazil and it went 
into effect on April first of that same year. 
During, the next two years reciprocity treaties were negotiated with 
the following countries: 
Dominican Republic • 
• • • • • • • June 41 1891 Spain for Cuba and Porto Rico •• June 16, 1891 
Salvador 
• • ••• • • • • • • • December 30, 1891 Nicaragua 
• • • • • • • • . • • • March 111 1892 Honduras 
• • • • • • • • • 
••• April 29, 1892 
Guatamala 
• • • • • ••• • • 
• • December 301 1$91 
Great Britain for West Indies. • • February 1, 1892 
German Empire ••• • • • • • • • • January 30, 1892 25 Austria-Hungary • • . . . • • • • M:l.y 25, 1892 
On April 20, 18921 the House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported 
favorably upon a resolution introduced by Mr. Stewart of Texas providing 
26 for the initiation of negotiations with Mexico. The report declared that 
23 Senate Executive Document, 119, 52nd Congress, 1st Session. 
24 ~· 
25 Reciprocity ~ Commercial Treaties, 153. 
26 House Report, 1145, 52nd Congress, 1st Session, 4; 
the removal of duty on lead ores would probably be of mutual advantage to 
the two countries and recommended the free admission of wool from ~~co 
in return for equivalent concessions that might be made by that country.27 
The American minister to Mexico was charged with the negotiations 
on behalf of the United States and the President of Mexico nominated a 
commissioner to represent the Mexican Government. Of the articles enumer-
ated in Section 3, however, none but coffee and hides were exp6rted by 
Mexico to the United States in considerable quantities and the prospect 
of their exemption from duty by the United States was not sufficient 
inducement to persuade the Mexican Government to make reciprocal conce~ 
sions, especially since it was not certain that the United States would 
impose the penalty duties upon Mexican products~28 Mexico claimed that it 
had uniformly followed the practice of having a single tariff with no 
discrimination between the imports from different countries and was re-1 
~ 29 luctant to change its historical policy. Under the circumstances, al._ 
though a reciprocity agreement was not negotiated, the penalty clause 
could hardly apply. 
A glance at the table on the previous page reveals that reciprocity 
agreements were not consummated with all the Latin American countries: 
The names of Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and Haiti are missing from 
those countries exporting the "tropical products. 11 The Government of 
Venezuela had shown an inclination to negotiate.and the Venezuelan 
27 Ibid. 
2S Reciprocity snQ.. Commercial Treaties,, 157. 
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minister at Washington had discussed the terms of a convention which he 
forwarded to his government for its approval. The Venezuelan president 
transmitted the convention to his congress which appointed a special 
commissioner to continue the negotiations. But the commissioner tailed 
t h . . t t' 30 to carry ou ~s ms rue ~ons. 
Haiti had acknowledged receiving Blaine~s invitation for reciprocal 
trade but made no other official response.31 
The ignoring of our invitation to open reciprocal trade agreements 
on the part of the Colombian Government was the occasion of a letter 
addressed by Mr. Blaine to the Colombian minister at Washington. 11It is 
deeply regretted by the President that his invitation to the Government 
of Colombia has not been responded to in the same conciliatory spirit. 1132 
The l~ister responded that under the most-favored-nation provision of 
the early treaty of 1846 between the United States and Colombia that the 
latter country was en~itled to all the privileges which the United States 
might concede to other nations. Nevertheless the Minister promised that 





• • • would use all the influence at his command to obtain 
from congress at its next meeting such an extension of the 
list of nondutiable merchandise as will justify any action 
which the President of the United States may be pleased to 
take postponing the suspension of the fr~~ entry of Colombian 







No further word was received from Colombia, and after a general 
warning to the countries involved on January 7, 1892, that unless sat-
isfactory arrangements were concluded by March 15, the privilege of 
free entry of their goods into the United States would be denied them, 
the President proclaimed that the penalty duties would be levied against 
Colombia, Venezuela, and Haiti commencing l4a.rch 15, 1892.34 
Colombia protested once more on the grounds of the earlier treaty 
which the United States declared was not applicable to nor affected by 
Section 3 of the 1-1CKinley Act. Finally the }fi.nister was forced to admit 
that the Colombian tariff was a high one but that there was no remedy for 
this. In a letter dated I~rch 12, 1892 Senor Hurtado made this fact clear 
I am free to admit that the tariff of Colombia is a high 
tariff and that it must consequently militate against the 
full development of our trade with foreign nations~ But 
this has to be so; it is an unavoidable evil common to all 
South American countries, where the revenue is chiefly de-
rived from import dues; and until such times as other systems 
of taxation be discovered and found efficient, so as to re-
move the burden which now weighs almost exclusively on imwrts, 
the evils of a high tariff must unfortunately be endured.J5 
Although the United States imported large amounts of coffee and other 
tropical products from countries which did not enter into reciprocity 
negotiations with us, penalty duties were applied only to those nations 
previously mentioned. The reason for this is made clear in a report 
presented by the House Committee on Ways and Means on June 61 1896 which 
included a statement upon trade with Argentina, written by William c. 
Curtis. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Senate Executive Document, 56, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session. 
No attempt was made to apply the retaliatory provision 
of the reciprocity section of the tariff act of 1$90 to any 
other country except Colombia, Venezuela., and Haiti, for 
the reason that the President lthough~ the duties imposed 
by them alone were onerous to American connnerce and re-
ciprocally unequal and unreasonable. There was some corres-
pondence with the Argentine Republic~ That Government con-
tended that the duties it imposed upon our peculiar products, 
such as lumber, refined petroleum, et cetera, were not un-
reasonable in view of the ta.x we imposed upon wool, which was 
its principle item of export to the United States. It was 
estimated at various times during the negotiation that if the 
United States would remove the duty from wool, the Argentine 
Government would make generous concessions in favor of our 
manufactures, but such an arrangement was not authorized by 
J.a.w.36 
In this instance where Argentina had a case in point the penalty was 
not applied, as it was directed only at those nations who deliberately 
retained high rates against American manufactures without cause. 
As a result of a resolution passed in the Senate during its first 
session in 1$92 the Secretary of State was asked for a detailed report 
upon the success of the reciprocity program up to that time. 
One of the most satisfactory of the reciprocity agreements had been 
made with Brazil. On November 15, 1889 the empire of Brazil had been 
peacefully overthrow.n and the republic established. A period of high 
prosperity had immediately followed in which foreign trade promised to be 
brisk~ In fact, so great was the demand for goods that utmost confusion 
resulted at the waterfronts which were unable to cope with the unprece-
dented traffic.37 Ships had to wait their turns to unload, sometimes for 
ma.ny days~ The railroads did not possess enough rolling stock to handle 
36 House Report, 2263, Supplement g., 54th Congress, 1st Session. 
37 Senate Document ~~ 55th Congress; 1st Session, 12. 
the freight which had to be stored in warehouses, soon_filled to overflow-
38 ing. But in the swmmer of 1891 a reaction set in followed by a depres-
sion. 
The :imports fell off rapidly, and the national obstacles 
to an increased commerce were supplemented by unusual 
efforts on the part. of European merchants to retain a 
trade that, under the reciprocity arrangement with this 
country, was seriously threatened. They reduced prices 
upon merchandise that might be bought in the United States 
and sold even at a loss, to prevent and frighten competition, 
and the steamship lines from Europe assisted them by cutting 
rates of transportation below the limit of profitable 
traffic.39 
England especially had been opposed to reciprocity as she foresaw 
in the United States a formidable rival to her monopoly of trade with 
the Latin American countries. 
The depression in Brazil was by no means confined to that country. 
On November 15, 1890~ the banking firm of Baring Brothers of London had 
been forced to suspend payments. 40 This bank was deeply involved in 
South American affairs and its failure precipitated a financial panic 
which spread throughout the world but which was particularly grave in 
the Latin American countries~ The United States was to experience its 
share in the panic of 1893. 
Although trade with Puerto P~co shows an increase for the period of 
reciprocity, nevertheless circumstances prevented that increase from 
being very great~ The sugar crops of 1891-1892 were partial failures, 
38 ~-
39 Ibid., 13. 
40 Reciprocity ~ Commercial Treaties, 163. 
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which, coupled with the low price of silver in that country prevented 
anything like notable gains from being made • 
The importing merchant is required to pay gold prices for 
his goods in New York and sells them at silver prices to 
his customers in Puerto Rico, which is equivalent to a 
nominal advance of 15 or 2~ in the cost of everything 
• • • without any corresponding incre~se in the incomes 
of the rich or the wages of the poor.41 
Santo Domingo also suffered from a poor sugar crop and financial 
depression. However, during the period of reciprocity their falling off 
of business with Europe was in greater proportion than their decrease of 
trade with the United States.42 
The countries hardest hit by the depression were Nicaragua, Honduras, 
Brazil and Chile. 43 As a result foreign capital was withdrawn and many 
banks and mercantile houses became insolvent. 
Added to the financial distress, or rather coinciding with it, were 
the revolutionary disturbances experienced in several of the Latin 
American countries.44 
The results of reciprocity can best be studied in the statistics 
of our exports and imports during the short period in which it was 
effective. In general, the exports to Cuba, Puerto Rico and Brazil were 
the most notable; export trade to the British West Indies remained con-
stant, while exports to Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatamala fell off during 
the years 1890-1$92, due not only to the depression but also to the lack 
41 Senate Document ~ 55th Congress, 1st Session, 17. 
42 Ibid., 22. 
-43 Reciprocity ~ Commercial Treaties, 163. 
44 ~., 177 • 
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of economic development~45 The year 1892 shows the greatest gains in ex-
ports from the United States due to bumper crops in 1891 and to partial 
crop failures in Europe. Our exports to Latin America during the 
reciprocity era were greater than our exports to Europe but showed a 
sharp decrease after the termination of the policy in 1894.46 
Regarding imports to the United States from Latin American countries, 
the figures show that about 78 per cent of their imports were sent here in 
1890, and about 84 per cent by 1894.47 Undoubtedly, the increase was 
caused by the threat of the reciprocity penalties; 
The effect of the reciprocity penalties is most noticeable in the 
statistics of those countries .barred by the penalties from trade 1.dth 
the United States from ~Ja.rch 15, 1892 to August 27, 1894. 
1891--- 7.32 of imports went to the United States 
1893 - 2.29 II II II tl II II II 
1894 - - - 1.73 II II tl II II II ll 
Expressed in money, there was a drop from a seventeen million dollar 
import trade to the United States in 1891 to only four million dollars 
in 1894.48 
With the exception of those countries affected by the penalty duties, 
there was no other great effect upon the imports into the United States 
which can be traced directly to the reciprocity features of the act of 
1890. The 1-icKinley tariff could not grant special privileges, but could 
45 ~., 180. 
46 IQisi., 177. 
" 
47 Ibid., 172 
48 ill£., 172 
only impose penalties. Since the countries penalized furnished only a 
small fraction of imports from Latin America, it is difficult to estimate 
any special benefits of the reciprocity clause upon the import trade~ 
By studying the statistics for each of the five "tropical products" 
separately one is able to obtain an overall view of the effect of reci~ 
procity on import trade. The imports of coffee, showing only a moderate 
tendency to increase, probably because they were kept on the free list, 
remained fq.irly constant and seemed little changed by the tariff act of 
1890.49 On the other hand, the imports of sugar increased more rapidly 
because the lack of duty made sugar cheaper, and large quantities of it 
were bought~ 
The reimposition of a duty on sugar by the act of 1894 
checked the fall in price and led to a considerable de-
cline in the imports and in the per capita consumption 
in 1895-9Q.. In 1897 the amount went up due to the heavy 
buying before the tariff of 1897 should go into effect. 50 
MOlasses had first been imported because of its high sugar content 
due to the imperfect methods of sugar extraction used in the Latin 
American countries. Later, however, these countries perfected the sugar 
extraction process so that the molasses was of little use to the United 
States refiner for this purpose and after 1897 molasses ceased to be 
imported at all. 51 The importation of hides was the least affected by 
the reciprocity provisions of the act of 1890: 
49 Ibid., 167. 
50 ~., 168. 
51 I2?E..' 169 ~ 
In considering these statistics it must be borne in mind that the 
chief purpose of the reciprocity section of the McKinley tariff had been 
to encourage United States exports to the Latin American countries so as to 
increase our markets. Even before the reciprocity clause had been added 
to the tariff, sugar had been already placed on the free list. Blaine's 
view was that we admitted one of South America's principal products with-
out demanding any reciprocal advantages in return. It was his plan to 
use sugar especially as a bargaining agent to open the Southern markets 
to our petroleum, machinery and manufactures. To determine the efficiency 
of the plan as tried is difficult, due to the short time the plan was 
actually in progress, and to the fact that financial depression and revo-
lutionary disturbances upset the normal flo1t1 of trade during that period 
and made anything like a scientific measurement of results hard to achieve. 
The report of the United States Tariff Commission declared that on the 
whole the penalties had been an effective means of securing tariff favors, 
considering the limited time in which reciprocity had been tried and under 
what circumstances it had "exerted a favorable influence upon the export 
trade of the United States.u52 Other writers fail to grow enthusiastic 
about the results of our first experiment in reciprocity, feeling that 
the retaliatory features of this policy were not such as to engender whole-
h rt d rt f th lat . Ame • t . 53 ea e suppo rom e ~n r~can coun r~es. Yet it should be 
recalled that Blaine had striven for a broader form of reciprocity but was 
defeated and had to be satisfied with the restricted form as found in 
52~· 
53 Robertson, Hispanic-American Relations, 219. 
section three of the l~Kinley Bill. 
The contestants of the 1892 presidential campaign were once more 
Harrison and Cleveland. In a. plank of the democratic platform written by 
Henry Watterson, editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, both Cleveland 
and his party were pledged to a tariff for revenue only.5i Cleveland, not 
wishing to alienate those who felt that the success of the Democrats would 
spell ruin for the country declared in his letter of acceptance that 1'Vle 
wage no exterminating war against any American interests. We believe that 
a readjustment can be accomplished in accordance with the principles we 
profess, without disaster or demolition.u 55 Apparently it was enough to 
inspire confidence or else the country was ready to welcome any modifica-
tion in the existing tariff for Cleveland was not only successful but, 
for the first time since the CiVil ~Jar, the Democrats enjoyed a majority 
not only in the House but in the Senate as vTell. True, the Senate majority 
was a slim one, but it was a majority, nevertheless~ 
William L. Wilson, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Ways 
and Means Committee, introduced a new tariff bill on December 19, 1893. 
The bill was remarkable in that it ultimately caused a. rift in the Demo-
cratic party and was debated longer than any other tariff bill in the 
history of the country. The bill as reported by the Ways and Heans CommitiB 
to the House provided for free raw sugar, reduced duties on refined sugar, 
and kept coffee, tea, hides, and molasses on the free list. In addition 
54 Tarbell, ~Nationalizing of Business, 199. 
55 ~., 200. 
56 to the list of free products was that of wool. But, as it will be seen 
later, the Democrats made no effort to use this exemption to secure recip-
rocal trade with Argentina, who exported large amounts of wool and who 
would have been willing to negotiate. 
The question of reciprocity early presented itself in the formation 
of the new tariff. Although the Republicans had accepted ,reciprocity 
reluctantly enough in the beginning it had become a prominent part of 
their program by 189.3. 57 As such it was denounced in the Democratic plat-
form. In the report of the Committee on \vays and Heans reconnnending the 
bill to Congress it had declared that reciprocity had brought no appreci-
able advantage to the American exporters and that it provided not for reci-
procity,in the true sense of the word but for retaliation.58 It expressed 
regret over the hard feeling which had been engendered by the passing of 
the penalties against certain countries and raised righteous hands in 
horror over the alleged repudiation of 11 our solelml treaty obligationa.u59 
As a result the House passed an amendment introduced by lf.Jr. Wilson which 
60 
specifically provided for the repeal of the reciprocity agreements. 
56 Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, 158. 
57 Laughlin and Willis, Reciprocity, 2.3.3. 
58 Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, 158. 
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The bill passed the lower branch of the legislature on February 1, 
1$94 and went to the Senate for consideration. There the Democrats had a 
bare majority and the industrial interests of the nation had a stronger 
proportionate representation. Senator A. B. Gorman of Maryland and Senator 
c. S • Brice of Ohio succeeded in modifying the measure not onzy in details 
but in principles as well. One of the bitterest assailants of the house 
bill was H. o. Havemeyer, president of the American Sugar Refining Company. 
As a result of rates provided in the McKinley bill, his concern showed a 
61 
profit of twenty-five million dollars in three years. Under the operation 
of the law sugar stocks had advanced eighty-five points.62 Later a charge 
was made that United States senators had been speculating in sugar stocks 
While the schedule was.under consideration. The accusation was investigated 
and several of the most eminent men of the time, including John Sherman and 
George F. Hoar, were questioned. Senators :t-1. s. Quay of Pennsylvania, and 
. 63 
J. R. McPherson of New Jersey frankly admitted that they had done so. 
Although the Democratic Senate ostensibly stood for tariff reform, in 
reality each senator was willing to have the duties lowered on every other 
product but the one in which he was especially interested. The Senate 
blamed Wilson and his aide, Crisp, for introducing a bill which could be 
termed a "free trade" measure While the House accused Senators Gorman and 
61 Tarbell, The Nationalizing of Business, 200. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Taussig, The Tariff History, 314. 
. 64 Brice of turning the bill into a "Republican protect~on measure." 
Actually the Senate won the struggle by levying a duty on raw sugar, rais-
ing the rates on the refined product, and reducing many other items only 
slightly. The House succeeded in keeping wool on the free list • Presi-
dent Cleveland denounced the tariff as an example of "party perfidy and 
party dishonor" and refused to sign it. 65 
The new tariff had incorporated a provision of two per cent tax on 
incomes of $4000 or more which was a Populist measure favored in. the West 
and South. Shortly after its passage the income tax feature of the bill 
was declared to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 66 
For different reasons the tariff was challenged by both Democrats 
and Rep!lblicans from the time it became a law, and it was obvious that it 
would be remade as soon as the opportunity presented itself to either 
party. Many felt that the bitterness engendered among the Democrats had 
weakened the party to such an extent as to make certain the Republican 
victory at the polls three months after the passage of the Wilson act, and 
to pave the way for the split in the party in the 1896 presidential elec-
tions. 67 Some historians felt that the tariff was only the outward symbol 
of a new trend of thought underlying the nation's whole economic outlook. 
64 o.o. Stealey, Twenty Years in the Press Gallery, New York, 
Publisher Printi..'llg Company, printers, 1906, ll5. 
65 Tarbell, The Nationalizing of Business, 202. 
66 ~· 
67 Stealey, Twenty Years in the Press Gallery, ll5. 
The betrayal of the cause of tariff reform in the house 
of its friends indicated plainly that protectionism 
represented the dominant conviction of the industrial 
forces which controlled the effective action of the 
national government. The consolidation of the nation~s 
internal economic life had bred the doctrine of economic 
nationalism in the country~s international relations. 0S 
The sudden cessation of reciprocity brought immediate repercussions 
from abroad. Sugar producing countries which had found ready markets in 
the United States complained the most bitterly as the reciprocity policy 
had affected sugar more than any other commodity. The minister of 
Guatamala, in a written memorandum, and in personal interviews, remonstrate 
against the abrogation of the reciprocity agreement. He pointed to the 
fact that his country had invested large sums of money in plantations and 
in machinery for the production of sugar with a view to enjoying the 
benefits of the favorable American market, and that this large outlay would 
not have.been incurred had it been supposed that the United States would 
abandon its policy of reciprocity so soon and reimpose the tax on sugar. 
69 Financial ruin was predicted for the sugar producers. 
~razil objected to the withdrawal of reciprocity on more technical 
grounds~ In the agreement made with Brazil, the decision stated that 
either country would inform the other of any desire to terminate the trade 
policy three months in advance and that the agreement would cease to be 
effective on either the first day of January or the first day of July.~O 
6S Tarbell, The Nationalizing of Business, 202. 
69 Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, 162. 
70 Ibid., 160. 
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The United States replied that the agreement was automatically cancelled 
by the new law and simply ceased to exist; that it had not enjoyed the 
status of a treaty binding upon the two governments, while the new law 
71 
was mandatory.. Brazil, however, insisting upon carrying out its part 
of the contract, formally denounced the treaty, and continued to grant 
tariff concessions to the United States until January 1, 1S95. 
It will be remembered that Argentina had declared that reciprocity 
would be an impossibility for her unless it included admitting her wool. 
When it became known that the United States Congress was considering the 
addition of wool to its free list in the tariff of 1S94, the Argentine 
minister in Washington submitted to the Secretary of State a memorandum 
setting forth the mutual economic advantages that would accrue to the 
United States and to their country by the free introduction of Argentine 
wool into our markets. In a subsequent communication, dated January 30, 
1S94, the Argentine minister further stated that his country, in adopting 
their tariff for that year, had included crude petroleum in the list of 
72 
articles to be admitted free of duty. He added that the acceptance of 
Argentine wool would extraordinarily increase the volume of trade between 
the two countries and 1t10uld permit the manufactured products of the United 
States to enter li1to active competition with similar articles of European 
origin. It was also expected that the Argentine Congress would exempt from 
71 ~· 
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the payment of duties lumber, lubricating and fuel oils, and refined 
petroleum.73 
This communication was forwarded by the Secretary of State to the 
Committee on \-fays and Neans in February, 1894, ;while the Wilson bill was 
under consideration. The Secretary of State also forwarded to the 
Cammittee on Finance· another communication from the Argentine minister 
enclosing a cablegram from the minister of ~oreign affairs at Buenos Aires 
with referenc'e to the vote of the Senate regarding the suggestion of the 
House to remove the duty on wool. It expressed the desires of the 
Argentines for reciprocity with the United States.74 But no notice was 
taken of the Argentine proposals by either the Senate or the House of 
Representatives. Argentina felt chagrined that her overtures toward 
closer commercial relations between the two nations had been treated so 
indifferently. later when the United States minister, lv!r. Buchanan, asked 
that some concessions might be made in the duties upon imports in the 
Argentine tariff of 1895, he was coolly informed that the Argentine Govern-
ment did not consider itself under any obligations to the United States 
because of the removal of duty upon wool. "He explained that his Govern-
ment understood the situation, and that our Congress did not remove the 
duty with any intention to benefit them, but merely as a political measure, 
and in response to the demands of public sentiment in the United States.n75 





terminate agreements, endeavored to do it more circumspectly than the way 
it was done in 1$94. 
The elections of 1894 returned a Republican majority to Congress: 
Once more the movement for reciprocity gained momentum. In 1$96 the ~·Jays 
and Neans Committee of the House of Representatives sent out circulars 
to the various business interests of the country to ascertain the concensus 
of opinion regarding reciprocity. The replies were overwhelmingly in 
favor of it. Of fifty-two commercial and industrial associations, boards 
of trade, and chambers of commerce consulted, fifty-one supported reci-
procity, while only fifteen of two hundred and fifty manufacturers and 
. 76 . 
merchants opposed ~t. As a consequence, a reciprocity plank was ~serted 
in the platform of 1896 and McKinley urged its support in his inaugural 
address of the following year. 
~kKinley called an extraordinary session of Congress to consider the 
condition of the revenues of the government in order to remedy the deficit 
in the Treasury. On Ivfarch 18, 1897, Hr. Dingley of Maine, chairman of the 
House Comrni.ttee on \'lays and Heans, introduced the bill which ult:i..ID.ately 
~as to bear his name. vfuen first proposed, Section three of the bill 
provided for reciprocity by two methodsJ the reduction of duties on 
certain items from countries which were willing to make similar reductions 
on the exports of the United States, and the imposition of penalty duties 
on countries which levied duties which could be considered unreasonable on 
76 Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, 197. 
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the products of the United States.77The bill was debated in the House for 
a period of ten days, but the reciprocity clause occasioned little comment 
except the criticism that Section three benefited only the farm-implement 
and the meat packing trust.78 
It was passed in the House an ~~rch 31 with a negligible amount of 
opposition. As was to be expected, the bill's progress through the 
Senate was more deliberate. Senator Allison introduced an amendment to 
sec~ion three whereby the President would be authorized to enter within 
two years into the negotiation of commercial treaties with other countrie~ 
In return for the admission of American products at reduced rates of duty 
the President could grant reductions not exceeding twenty per cent of the 
regular tariff schedule, and could grant free admission of those products 
~1ich were not the natural products of the United States and which were on 
the dutiable list. The treaties would not be valid beyond a period of 
five years.79 A long debate followed but the Senate finally accepted the 
Allison amendment on July 7 and sent the bill to a conference committee of 
both Senate and House members. The committee restored Section three of 
the bill with some changes: 
1. It crossed off chicle, silk, laces, mineral waters, 
sugar and molasses, while it reduced the minimum 
duties on some of the remaining articles. 
2. Coffee and tea remained on the list of free articles 
on which penalty duties mi~1t be imposed. 
77 Ibid., 198. 
78 ~., 199. 
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3. Hides and skins were struck off the list and tonka 
and vanilla beans substituted. 
4. The bill required the approval by the whole Congress 
and not just the Senate.BO 
It will be noted that the removal of sugar and skins from the list 
meant that the tariff measure was not designed primarily for the encourage-
ment of Latin American trade. It was the larger markets of European trade 
that the United States legislators hoped to open with favorable tariff 
agreements, and which formed the chief burden of those agreements which 
were known as the Kasson treaties, but which failed to be ratified by 
the United States: 
The Dingley Tariff did little or nothing to further trade with the 
Latin American countries. Shortly after its passage the United States 
joined the ranks of the imperialist nations followed by its adoption 
of the Big Stick policy--none of which was calculated to inspire confidence 
in the smaller countries. Rather, it filled them with apprehension over 
81 
the growing economic 'American invasion~ so obviously manifest since 1895. 
80 ~., 200. 
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CHAPrER IV 
RECIPROCITY WITH CUBA 
As far back in the history of our country as the days of Thomas 
Jefferson, the United States has felt a particular interest in the island 
of Cuba. Its strategic position, commanding as it does the Gulf of Mexico, 
the mouth of the ~fississippi, as well as the peninsula of Florida, has 
given it a special importance which could not be overlooked by those charged 
with guarding the welfare of this country. Frequently, from the time of 
Jefferson to that of l.fcK:i.nley, Cuba was the subject of much speculative 
thought on the part of the Statesmen of the United States, as is revealed 
in their correspondence and speeches. Previous to the Civil War, the 
Southern states had looked at Cuba with longing eyes, seeing in it the 
possibility of adding several slave stat~s to increase the prestige and 
power of the South. The disgraceful Ostend 11anifesto 1~s another mani-
festation of the trend of thought current in the United States. 
In keeping with her colonial policy, Spain had restricted the 
commerce of Cuba almost exclusively to herself~ During the nineteenth 
century, as her other colonies won their independence, it became increas-
ingly difficult for Spain to enforce her prohibitive trade laws in Cuba.l 
But she persisted and adopted a new policy m1ich took the form of 
1 Albert G. Robinson, Cuba ~ the Intervention, New York, 
Longmans, Green and Company, 1905, 3. 
discriminating tariffs, applied to both imports and exports. Finally :in 
1884, Spa:in 'tia.S induced to negotiate ltdth the United States a treatyof 
commerce and reciprocity for Cuba at about the same time that the latter 
country was making a similar treaty with l1exico. The Senate of the United 
States, however, failed to ratify either treaty. 
In 1890, while the American tariff bill was under discussion in 
Congress, Spain, in expectation of increased American duties on tobacco, 
decreed an increase of twenty per cent on imports to Cuba and Porto Rico 
from all ports except those of Spain.2 After the !~Kinley bill became a 
law, Cuba sent a delegation to l1adrid in January 1891. urging reciprocity 
with the United States. There were some who even favored a revolution if 
a treaty was not negotiated.3 
The retaliatory features of the McKinley tariff spelled ru:in for 
the economic life of Cuba if a treaty was not made, as it would close the 
American market to all but the finest of Cuban tobacco. By its protection 
to American refiners it compelled a large number of manufacturers of high-
grade sugar in Cuba to close down. It threatened the entire loss of the 
American market in sugar to the advantage of other tropical rivals unless 
Spain modified her colonial trade policy.4 Doubtless, sensing that a 
refusal to enter into a reciprocity agreement would increase the impulse 
2 James 1-1. Callahan, ~ ~ International Relations, Baltimore, 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1899, 455. 
3 Ibid~ 
4 Leland H. Jenks; 2!:!!: Cuban Color:cy:: ! Study i!!, Sugar, New York, 
Vanguard Press, 1928, 39. 
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towards revolution or annexation, Spain expressed a willingness to nego-
. . 5 t~ate wh~ch ~esulted in the Foster-Canovas treaty of 1891. 
The treaty encouraged an unprecedented expansion of Cuban raw sugar. 
In 1893 Cuba's sugar crop passed the million ton mark for the first time. 
The benefits of the remission of duty went almost entirely to the Cuban 
planter who enjoyed a brief spell of prosperity during the short time the 
treaty was in force. Nor was it felt at this time that the trade with Cuba 
was injuring any American industry as domestic sugar production in the 
United States had not yet reached the importance it was to assume a few 
6 years later. 
The Wilson tariff of 1894, Which restored the duty on raw sugar 
while retaining the differential on the refined product, automatically 
abolished reciprocity with Cuba. In the face of falling price for sugar, 
the effect of the tariff change struck with full force at the Cuban 
producers. Prices fell below two cents a pound for the first time in the 
history of the sugar industry. 7 At the same time the restored duties of 
the colonial system meant higher prices for everything Cubans purchased 
abroad. "Thousands who did not join the men who took the field in revolu-_ 
tion aided the Republican movement from their dwindling hoards." 8 Had the 
government been conducted vrith a view to the rights and interests of the 
5 Ibid. 
6 Laughlin and Willis, Reciprocity, 367. 
7 Jenks, Q!g: ~Colony, 40. 
8 ~.· 
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Cuban people, both the economic distress and the political unrest which 
followed might have been avoided.9 The termination of the treaty of 11394 
has generally been regarded as the ~principal underlying economic grievance 
contributing to the Cuban insurrection of February 1 1895.1110 The depression 
of this time impressed the people of Cuba with the fact that reciprocity 
with the United States had meant prosperity. 
The extent to which reciprocity had increased the export trade of 
the United States with Cuba ma.y be seen in the following table: 
1890 • • • • • • • $13,0134,415 
1891 • • • • • • • J21 224,131313 
1892 • • • . . • • 17,953,570 
1893 • • • • • • • 24,157,6913 
1894 • • • • • • • 20,J25,321 
1895 ••• • • • • • J2 1 1307,661 
The last figures show a falling off in trade which was due not only to 
the cessation of reciprocity but to general disturbances on the island 
ll 
that year. .The imports from Cuba to the United States show a marked 
increase during this same period, rising from $53,1301,591 in 11390 to 
$713,706,506 in 11393.12 
Almost four years of revolution and war which followed the outbreak 
of 1895 succeeded in impoverishing Cuba and left it with economic, 
9 Robinson, ~ ~ the Intervention, 32. 
10 Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, 1900-1935, 
Menasha, Wisconsin, George BantaFili.b'lishing Company, 1935, 205. 
ll H. P. vlillis, "Reciprocity with Cuba," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science,_ XXII, Philadelphia, 1903, 136. 
12 ~-
political, and social conditions demanding immediate attention.13 It was 
revealed in the census ordered by President MCKinley that the population 
of the island had decreased 12 per cent during the period of conflict, 
and its wealth two-thirds.14 Even before hostilities had ceased, the 
President spoke of the task of rehabilitation which lay before the 
United States in regard to Cuba. 
·As soon as we are in possession of Cuba and have pacified 
the island it will be necessary to give aid and direction to 
its people to form a government for themselves. This should be 
undertaken at the earliest moment consistent with safety and 
assured success. It is important that our relations with this 
people shall be of the most friendly ~haracter and our commercial 
relations close and reciprocal. It should be our duty to assist 
in every proper way to build up the waste places of the island, 
encourage the industry of the people, and assist them to for.m a 
government which shall be free and independent, thus realizing 
the best aspirations of the Cuban people.l5 
One of the first tasks confronting the United States at the conclu-
sion of the war was restoration of order on the island, and secondly, 
cleaning up the island through proper sanitary measures. vfuile the 
United States accomplished the above tasks in a masterly way, it was much 
slovter in establishing the economic reorganization so necessary in making 
real the independence of the Cuban people. }any of the American officials 
stationed on the island saw the necessity of the solution of the sugar 
question, and of the other questions of trade affecting Cuba, as the first 
13 U • S. Tariff Connnission, ~ Effects of the Cuban Reciprocity. 
Treaty of 1902, Washington, 1929, 373. 
14 Report .2!1. the Census of Cuba, 1899, ~iashington, Government 
Printing Office, 1900, 4. 
15 The Effects of ~ Cuban Reciprocity Treaty, 375. 
16 
step toward the successful solution of every other problem. General 
Wilson stated that 11the establishment of proper economic conditions and 
proper trade relations with the United States was of even greater impor-
tance than the establishment of proper political institutions."l7 
To understand the Cuban Question which became the subject of a bitter 
controversy in the United States during the next few years, several facts 
mu.st be noted at the outset~ One was the rapid growth of' the sugar-beet 
industry in Europe after 1$70. That industry was encouraged by the govern-
ment bounties and grew so rapidly that it soon sought new markets. It had 
a paralyzing effect upon Cuban exports, however, and :made the island almost 
entirely dependent upon the United states as consumer of its principal 
export, sugar.18 The second factor which caused some difficulty was that 
the annexation of Hawaii, the Philippines, and Porto Rico under the 
American flag gave those countries access to the markets of the United 
States which had to be denied to Cuba because it was ~foreign territory•.19 
Even the West Indian islands, subject to powers other than the United States 
were able to get preferential rates as a result of reciprocity. Yet reci-
procity was denied to Cuba because, not having a government of her own she 
was Unable to negotiate a treaty with another government1 In his report 
16 ~., 337. 
17 ~· 
lS Ed"t>r.in F. Atkins, "Tariff Relations With Cuba-Actual and 
Desirable," Annals of ~American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, XXXII, 321. 
19 Report .2!2 the Census of Cuba, 34. 
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for 1889, the Secretary of War, Root, called attention to this lamentable 
state of affairs. 
It does not seem that, so long as we retain the control of 
Cuba and preclude her people from making trade agreements 
or treaties on their own account, we ought to treat her 
sugar producers less favorably than we do their competitors 
in the vlest India Islands which are subject to other powers, 
and I recommend that during the period of our occupation of 
the island the duties linposed upon the importation into the 
United States from Cuba of the products of that island be 
reduced to the same rates which will be imposed upon the goods 
imported from Jamaica in case the Senate should ratify the 
pending reciprocity treaties.20 
Besides the handicaps mentioned above, Cuban agriculture was con-
fronted with special difficulties arising out of the war, such as an 
accumulation of losses and debts, a reduction in the number of plantation 
hands, and an increase in the cost of agricultural labor caused by the 
stabilization of the currency.21 
Another obstacle to the solution of the Cuban question was the rapid 
growth attained by the sugar-beet industry of the United States after 
1890. This new industry had profited by the Cuban war, and the Dingley 
tariff had given it further encouragement, especially in the western part 
. 22 
of the Un~ted States. Between 1896 and 1902 thirty-five new factories 
were erected. The census of 1900 estimated the industry had a capital 
investment of tvTenty-one million dollars. 23 
20 The Effects of the Cuban Reciprocity Treaty, 376. 
21 ~-
22 Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, 134. 
23 ~. 
-o:::>-
During 1899 and 1900 the American officials on the island continued 
to urge action by the United States to remedy the economic situation of 
Cuba by giving her products preferential tariff rates. General 1'iood 
stated the '~igh duties against Cuban products mean that the development 
will be slow, if at all,while a lm'J'ering of the duties would cause the 
developme~t of the island to be rapid.n24 The Cubans themselves hoped for 
free trade with the United States or if that was not possible, then, 11to 
establish a similar tariff to that which is stipulated in the treaty of 
reciprocity known as the ~1cKinley bill. u25 
The planters, large and small, the clerks, merchants, laborers, 
artisans,--the people, in fact--as a nation view reciprocity 
with the United States as an abstract thing that is on a par 
with their coveted independence. The less educated classes 
may not call it reciprocity • They knovi that it is something 
which will give Cuba the chance to grm-r, and themselves to 
live and prosper. But, high and lm1, they all look to the 
United States for the action which will ~gsure to the country 
a real industrial and commercial future. 
Finally, on February 19, 1900, a joint resolution was introduced 
in the House of Representatives to admit sugar and molasses of Porto Rico 
and Cuba free of duty.27 The resolution was referred to the Committee on 
vlays and Heans and, on }fay 26, Nr. Grosvenor submitted an adverse repo::t 
of the Committee with the recommendation that the resolution be tabled. 
24 Report of the Hilitary Governor of Cuba in Civil Affairs for 1900 
Vol. I, Part I, Havana, 1901, 77. 
25 11Recorrnnendations of Senor Perfecto I.acoste, Secretary of 
Agriculture, Commerce and Industries of Cuba," in ~., Part 4, 6. 
26 General Elnilio l~unez, 11Cuba Demands Reciprocity,u Independent, 
Vol. 53, 25Bl. 
27 House Joint Resolution 181, 56th Congress, 1st Session. 
The reasons assigned were that the tariff of 1897 has been designed to 
increase revenue and to protect the sugar-beet industry, while the sole 
effect of this resolution would be to increase "the already large wealth 
2S 
of the sugar trust." War had been declared between the sugar-beet 
industry of the United States and the American Sugar Refining Company, 
more frequently known as the sugar trust. 
Because of the agitation in the press and the clamor of public 
opinion both in Cuba and in the United States, it was decided to allow 
Cuba to take the first step toward autonomy. A general election of dele-
gates to a Constitutional Convention was scheduled to take place on 
September 15, 1900. These met for the first time on November 5. 
On February 21, 1901, while the Cuban Constitutional Convention 
was in progress, the Government of the United States sent to Cuba a draft 
of the now famous, or perhaps infamous, Platt Amendment, which, among 
other things, gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuba in 
order to protect its independence, and the right to use the Isle of 
Pin 1 . t t• 29 es as a coa mg s a ~on. 
The Platt Amendment immediately provoked much heated debate among 
the delegates who feared that the sovereignty of their island \'rould be 
impaired if they accepted it. The United States was firm, however, and 
inferred that reciprocity could not be considered until the Cubans had 
established their government, and a constitution which did not include the 
2S House Report 1766, 56th Congress, 1st Session. 
29 The l!:ffects of the Cuban Reciprocity Treaty, 3BO. 
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Platt Amendment would not receive the approval of the United States.30 
In order to settle the exact meaning of several points of the Platt Amend-
ment, the Cuban delegates resolved to send a committee of five members to 
1'lashington • 
The Cuban Committee arrived in 'tvashington on April 24, 1901, and 
remained four days. On April 25 they called at the vfar Department where 
they met Secretary -of War Root. The chairman of the Committee told Root 
that in general the delegates were opposed to the Platt Amendment as an 
infringement of their sovereign rights, and that the economic questions, 
which 1.vere of paramount :importance to the welfare of Cuba, had not been 
mentioned in the amendment.31 Root promised tb present their point of 
view to the President and arranged for their meeting him. The President 
listened sympathetically to the presentation of the Committee and ex-
plained that he would express his ideas to· Root who would convey them to 
the Committee. A three-hour conference followed in which 
• • • it appears that the terms of the Platt Amendment were 
examined at great length, l<Tr. Root being particularly anxious 
to allay the fears concerning interventio~ and to demonstrate 
that the paramount object and interest of the amendment was 
to guarantee the independence of Cuba • • • the Secretary of 
War explained that Cuba, not being a judicial entity, could not 
enter upon a bilateral contract such as a reciprocity treaty 
with the United States; whereupon the chairman of the committee 
indicated the desirability of obtaining the formal promise of 
the E:x:ecutive with respect to securing economic measures 
L[egislatioBl favorable to Cuban products. The Secretary ex-
plained that speaking only for himself and in the name of the 
President, he could give the assurance that once the government 
30 ~., 381 
31 ~., 382 
-88-
of Cuba was established, representatives -vrould innnediately be 
appointed to study and propose a treaty of commerce which 32 
should be based on mutual benefits and friendly relations. 
The Committee, reassured, returned to Cuba ~ere it informed the 
delegates of the American interpretation of the, Platt Amen&lent and of 
the promise of the President to use his good offices in securing some 
kind of preferential tariff arrangement with Cuba~33 The Cuban Connnittee 
had been allowed to take notes dur:lng the interview with Root, and these 
served as a basis for their report to the Constitutional Convention, and 
of the account in the local paper, I.a Patria. The Cuban documents re-
cording the meeting liith Root were published officially by the Government 
of Cuba in 191S. No counterpart of the Cuban documents were filed in 
American State papers and the Cuban account was the only document on the 
subject.34 Thls, naturally gave rise to much spec~tion by various 
groups in the United States. It was later urged that the United States 
was bound by MCKinley~s pledge to effect reciprocity with Cuba, and that 
failure to do so was a violation of good faith.35 Opponents of reciprocity 
declared that the President had no authority to make such a promise, and 
32 J.1:?M., 3S3. 
33 Robinson, ~ and the Intervention, 271. 
34 2 J.1:?M., p. 7. 
35 \villiam A. ~fuite1 11Cuban Reciprocity-A liforal Issue," !.fcClure~s 
~s!zine, Vol. 19, September 1902, 394. 
that if made' J.•t ··,..,s in no wa' y bm· ding.36 Ev th f ·H-K· 1 "Q en e successor o ~~ J.n ey1 
President Roosevelt, was not certain to what extent the United States had 
committed itself~ 
There was difficulty in determining just what promise or 
representations were made to the Cuban delegates when they 
visited Vfashington last summer fSiiJ previous to the adoption 
of the Platt Amendment as a part of the Cuban constitution. 
There was no record of any promise, but the understanding 
seemed to be that reciprocity arrangements were to be made 
with Cuba of a nature which would give the island~s products 
an advantage in the markets of the United States.37 
On June 20, 1902, Senator Elkins quoted President 1-icKinley as having 
said to the Cuban Committee, "If you only were a member of the family, how 
easy it would all be. n38 
Although the writer investigated all available documents relating 
to the conversation of 1-kKinley with the Cuban Committee, no satisfactory 
proof presented itself until a record of a conversation of Root with his 
biographer, almost thirty years later, settled the previously moot point. 
Mr. Root subsequently examined a translation of this report 
LPresumably the Cuban document of 191~ and stated that it was 
substantially correct although the exact phraseology could not 
-be relied upon. He specifically declhled to have a stenographic 
record made of the conversations because he did not believe that 
he was authorized to make official interpretations of the Act 
of Congress and preferred to have the talk retain the character 
of unofficial and personal conversations.39 
The Platt Amendment which had become a law in the United States on 
Harch 2, 1901, was adopted in Cuba on June 12 of the same year by a vote 
.36 Willis, "Reciprocity with Cuba," 137. 
37 Quoted in ~ Effects 2[ the Cuban Reciprocity Treaty, from 
Journal of Commerce, March 12, 1902, 1. 
38 Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 7639. 
39 Philip c. Jessup, Elihu Root, Vol. I, (American Political Leaders 
Series, ed. by Allen Nevins) New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1938, 318. 
of sixteen to eleven, (four members were absent) and added to the consti-
t t . . 40 u ~on as an append~. 
In the months that intervened before the opening of the United 
States Congress there was much Cuban agitation.for reciprocity. The 
month of October, especially, witnessed a general exhibition of popular 
interest. The third of this month was declared a holiday, and people of 
all classes--bankers, merchants, planters, Thaborers--united in public 
demonstrations.41 11A procession numbering fifteen thousand men paraded 
the streets of Havana, and marched to the Palace, where a committee 
presented a petition to the Military Governor, requesting the reduction 
of the United States tariff on sugar and tobacco. 1142 Other authorities 
placed the number as high as twenty thousand.43 In Santiago, the Chamber 
of Commerce called a public meeting at which it was reported eight 
thousand were present, to endorse a similar memorial.44 
The report of the Secretary of vlar for 1901 was made public for the 
opening of Congress, in which he urged reciprocity as duty to Cuba, as an 
advantage to the .~erican exports, and for reasons of public policy.45 
President Roosevelt, in his message to Congress, also advocated reciprocity 
40 The Effects of the Cuban Reciprocity Treaty, 385. 
41 Robinson, ~ and the Intervention, 279. 
42 Ibid~ 
43 Fitzgibbon, ~~the United States, 207. 
44 Robinson, 12£• cit. 
45 Willis, "Reciprocity \'lith Cuba, 11 138. 
but with much less urgency than he was to show at a later date. Following 
the President•s message the matter of reciprocity was referred to the 
Committee on Ways and Means who began their hearings: 
It became clear at the outset that the contest which was to take 
place in both houses of Congress during the remainder of the session was 
in reality a war between the t\o;o major sugar industries of the country • 
The sugar beet industry, which had made great strides since 1895, saw in 
reciprocity with Cuba a blight to its hopes of supplying the entire 
American market within a period of ten years, providing it received the 
protection which it felt was necessary~46 Under the leadership of Henry 
T • Oxnard, president of the American Beet Sugar Association, the industry 
established in Washington none of the most aggressive and persistent 
lobbies which had been seen in many years.n47 The Association could count 
as its allies the cane sugar producers of Louisiana, the tobacco growers 
of several states, while it was ~understood• to have strong backing from 
iian . t t 48 the Hawa sugar m eres s. 
Root, as Secretary of War, responsible for the good management of 
Cuban interests, felt that 11the chief opposition to fair and honorable 
economic treatment of Cuba11 came from the American beet sugar interests 
and he 11 fought them up and down the line, by argument, by his friendship 
46 George Kennan, 11The Conflict of Sugar Interests, 11 Outlook, 
Vol. 70, January 18, 1902, 367-368. 
47 Robinson, ~ and the Intervention, 282. 
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. 49 
with members of the Senate and House; by every means at his disposal." 
During the hearings fifty-four persons ~estified, sixteen of them in 
favor of reciprocity, thirty-eight opposed to it.50 The members of the 
beet sugar industry and their sympathizers endeavored to show that the 
~nole reciprocity movement was simply a scheme to enrich the American 
Sugar Refining Company, which they accused of holding large interests in 
the Cuban sugar industry. There is no doubt that the last statement was 
true, as Havemeyer, president of this company, in his testimony before 
the Senate Committee, admitted owning 40 per cent of the Trinidad Sugar 
Company's stock, his partner Semff owning 40 per cent, and E. F. Atkins, 
one of the organizers of the sugar trust, holding the remaining 20 rl3r 
,51 
cent. Nor can there be any doubt that the sugar trust would profit 
from reciprocity; any company, American or Cuban, which was engaged in 
Cuba's principal industry would profit if given favorable markets in the 
United States, including the thousands of planters and laborers connected 
with the industry, and thousands of other Cubans who l'tould be favorably 
affected by the general prosperity of the island. The real crux of the 
problem appears to be: would reciprocity with Cuba seriously affect 
American interests7 
49 Jessup, Elihu Root, 326. 
50 The Effects of the Cuban Reciprocity Treaty, 389. 
51 Senate Document 434, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 3. 
T. G. Balmer, one of the champions of the American Beet Sugar 
Association,thought it would, and foretold the ruin of the native beet 
sugar industry valued at thirty million dollars, and of the cane sugar 
industry of Louisiana and Texas valued at one hundred million dollars, 
with five hundred thousand men suddenly unemployed.52 A dire picture, 
certainly. There were others, however, who thought this view an exagger-
ated one, clauding the real issues. 
The Oxnard lobby has succeeded in creating the impression that 
it is an attempt to take protection away from the American 
farmer, who is represented as being on the eve of making an 
everlasting fortune by raising beets, and that this would be 
done for the real benefit of the sugar trust, which would 
simply pocket the amount of the duty ~thout giving any in-
crease of price to the Cuban producer~~J 
The testimony or Oscar v'l. Donner and F. B. Thurber created a stir 
among the beet sugar supporters, as they felt it did much to back up 
their case. Donner claimed that he handled the advertising for the sugar 
trust; that he made a collection of statistics, newspaper cuttings, and 
so forth, 'favorable to the sugar industry, and •·lith the permission or 
Havemeyer, these had been sent to the mailing agency of the American 
Sugar Refining Company. He estimated that about two hundred and fifty 
thousand persons had been contacted in this way.54 
Thurber, president of the American Export Association, admitted 
under questioning having asked and received twenty-~ive hundred dollars 
52 Ibid., 27. 
53 Jessup, Elihu Root, 327. 
54. Senate Document, lr2.!z., 12ff. 
from the sugar trust to help finance the literature sent out by him 
favoring reciprocity. He also received twenty-eight hundred dollars 
from the Cuban general fund by order of General Wood.55 These contri-
butions helped finance literature which was sent to about eighty thousand 
11leaders of thought 11 in order to win their support for Cuban reciprocity. 
Colonel Tasker H. Bliss, United States Collector of Customs at 
Havana, in his testimony described the Cuban situation as nvery serious, 11 
adding that, while business conditions sho\"ted no loss as yet, that the 
sale of the year~ s sugar supply at the prevailing prices would ruin the 
planters, and consequently the island, as he claimed that three-fourths 
of the people ~rere dependent upon the sugar industry. As indebtedness 
of one hundred million dollars was on the sugar property he stated, and 
a refusal to lower duties would force Cuba to seek annexation with the 
United States against its will.56 
Telegrams from Cuba flooded the offices of the President, the War 
Department, and the Ways and Heans Committee. By January, two large sugar 
mills had to stop grinding, and it was feared that if others followed 
• , ~-b th . . . ght b . t ' 57 and discharged the~ ~ orers, e cr1s1s m1 ecome acu e. The 
Secretary of vlar remarked that 11aside from the moral obligation • • • 
and • •• commercial advantage involved in a reciprocity treaty, there 
are the weightiest reasons of American public policy pointing in the same 
55 Ibi.d., 19-21 
56 Kennan, 11The Conflict of Sugar Interests, 11 36S. 
57 ~., 370. 
direction • • • • The same considerations which led to the war with Spain 
nmi require that a commercial agreement ca.n be made under which Cuba ca.n 
n?S 
live. 
Weeks passed without a report from th~ Committee as some of the 
Republican members joined the Democrats in their opposition to reci-
procity with Cuba. Efforts toward conciliation were made in committee 
conferences, party caucuses, and through consultation at the \illite House, 
but all these measures, for the time at least, seemed only to provoke 
increased resistance. Finally on ~~rch 19, 1902, ~~. Payne, Cha~ of 
the \'lays and l•feans Comrnittee introduced a bill authorizing the President 
to negotiate commercial arrangements for reduction of duties of 20 per cent 
effective to December 1, 1903. In the majority report, returned to the 
House on V~rch 31, the Committee favored approving the bill as read. The 
time was set for December 1, 1903, because it was believed that the work 
of the Brussels Sugar Convention would bring a.n end to the sugar bounty 
system of Europe, restore normalcy to the price of Cuban sugar, and thus 
make reciprocity with Cuba necessary.59 
In the meantime, delegates from a number of British Chambers of 
' 
Commerce in England visited the Foreign Secretary, Lord Landsdowne on 
1~rch 11, 1902, and declared that the contemplated American reciprocity 
with Cuba would seriously harm British commercial interests and urged the 
Secretary to have the British Ambassador at Washington do what he could to 
5S Elihu Root, The Hilitary and Colonial: Policy of the United 
States, Addresses and Reports edited by Robert Bacon and James B. Scott, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1916, 219. 
59 The Effects of the Cuban Reciprocity Treaty, 401. 
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hinder the treaty • "The interview was brief, but the Associated Press 
understands that, wh~ promising to look into the matter, Lord La.ndsdowne 
gave but famt encouragement to the delegation.u60 
On April 8, The House voted to discuss the bill, which it did during 
the next few weeks. The debates were long and inclined to generate more 
heat than light. 1-fr. Root wrote to General Wood in Cuba: 
A really serious fight is going on in Congress over the ques-
tion of making any concession whatever to Cuba • • • At this 
moment it is impossible to tell what the outcome will be. 
The beet sugar people are claiming not merely that they have 
votes enough to prevent any measure from passing, but they 
have a majority of the Republican caucus on conference so that 
they can prevent any measure from being reported. I am not at 
all certain that their claim is not justified by facts. At 
all
6
events there is evidently a very long, hard fight before 
us. 1 
During the months m which rival producers 11were fightmg to a 
draw in Congress • • • while protestmg their love for Cuba, 11 the powers 
of Europe assembled at Brussels to put an end to the export bounty system 
for their mutual advantage. 62 The Brussels Convention, i'rhich was to be-
come effective in September, 1903, offered Cuba accessibility to markets 
other than those of the United States. It 1~s understood that Great 
Britain would be willing to offer preferential arrangements. When con-
sular reports suddenly disclosed that since 1900 American exports to Cuba. 
had been falling as compared with those of Great Britain, France, and 
60 Journal of Connnerce and Commercial Bulletin, lvJarch 13, 1902, 
cited in ~., 425. - . 
61 Jessup, Elihu Root, 327. 
62 Jenks, ~Cuban Colony, 135. 
Gei'JIIa.Ily, the Administration became tremendously anxious ·to save the 
exports of the United States from adverse discrimination.63 
During the course of the Congressional debates, Mr. N:Orris suggested 
the addition of an amendment to repeal the differential on refined sugar. 
With this amendment added the bill was finally passed and sent to the 
Senate, where it was referred to the committee on Relations With Cuba. 
The Senate Committee resolved to investigate the charges that only the 
sugar trust would oenefit from a reciprocity treaty and conducted a 
series of hearing which lasted from l~y 1 to June 16. 
It was charged that the American Sugar Refining Company had already 
purchased the Cuban sugar crop, and was only waiting for favorable tariff 
regulations to bring it into the United States.64 Actually, about 20 per 
cent of it had been previously purchased. E. F. Atkins claired that there 
were only about six large American owned sugar estates in Cuba, while 
others endeavored to show that there were at least one hundred seventy-two 
under American owners. 65 In reality, this was a difficult po:int to decide 
because some Cubans, hoping to fare better economically, had become 
American citizens, or had their property held in some American citizen's 
name. The evidence offered was as conflicting as that healtd in the House. 
J.vleanwhile, the price of Cuban sugar continued to slump. The Cubans 
themselves seemed to be the last ones consulted. The complaints of the 
63 ~., ]j6. 
64 Senate Document ~' 57th Congress, 1st Session, 4. 
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Cuban press, printed in Spanish, were seldom available for the American 
readers. Visitors to the island saw the well-swept streets of Havana, 
listened to glowing reports of educational establishments, sanitary 
improvements, and the decrease of yellow fever, and went home satisfied 
that all was well, without having even glimpsed the real Cuba.66 In the 
opinion of one writer: 
• • • the majority of the Cormnittee will be compelled to do 
something to avert a crisis in Cuba, whether they want to do 
anything or not. The Administration favors action; public 
opinion outside of Louisiana and the beet sugar states seems 
to demand it; and the trend of events in Cuba may shortly 
render it absolutely inevitable as a means of preventing gis-
order and insuring the establishment of a Cuban Republic. ~ 
The Administration began to exert pressure, and a sharply worded 
message from the President gave warning to all recalcitrant members to 
fall in line; 
••• Yesterday, June 12, I received by cable from the 
American minister in Cuba, a most earnest appeal from 
President Palma for 'legislative relief before it is too 
late /fiii/ country financially ruined.• 
The granting of reciprocity with Cuba is a proposition 
which stands entirely alone. The reasons for it far out-
weigh those for granting reciprocity with any other nation, 
are entirely consistent with preserving intact the protective 
system under which this country has thriven so ma.rvelously • • • 
Objection has been made to the granting of the reduction on 
the ground that the substantial benefit '\'lOuld not go to the 
agricultural producer of sugar, but would inure to the Ameri-
can sugar refiners. In my judgment provision can and should 
be made which will guarantee us against this possibility. 
Some of the citizens oppose the lowering of the tariff 
on Cuban products, just as three years ago they opposed the 
admission of the Hawaiian Islands, lest free trade with them 
66 Robinson, ~and the Intervention, 293. 
67 Kennan, "The Conflict of Sugar Interests, 11 369. 
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might ruin certain of our interests here. In the actual event 
their fears proved baseless • • • In my judgment no American 
will be hurt and many American industries will be benefitted 
by the proposed action. It is to our advantage as a nation 
that the growing Cuban market should be controlled by American· 
producers. 
The events following the war with Spain and the prospec-
tive building of the isthmian canal render it certain that we 
must take in the future a far greater interest than hitherto 
in what happens throughout the West Indi~s, Central America 
and the adjacent coasts and waters. We expect Cuba to treat 
us on an exceptional footing politically, and we should put 
her in the same exceptional position economically.6S 
This rather lengthy excerpt from Roosevelt~s message is interesting 
in that he answers every argument of the opposition, and reveals very 
clearly his attitude on Carribean affairs. It was also a clarion call to 
those Republicans who had joined the Democrats in fighting reciprocity to 
preserve party unity~ 
Despite the urgent proddings of the President, Congress adjourned 
on July 1 without passing the reciprocity bill. .Roosevelt, however, took 
matters into his own hands and prepared a treaty. He also outlined plans 
to appeal to the people in view of the Congressional elections soon to be 
held. 69 on July 4, Secretary of State Hay submitted a draft convention 
to Cuba. Nothing more could be done until the following fall. 
On October 2S, 1902, Cuba returned the draft with a counter proposal, 
signifying her willingness to negotiate, although an Associated Press 
dispatch, dated October 27, stated that "Cuba had returned a draft 
6S Senate Document, ~~ 57th Congress, 1st Session. 
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reciprocity trea.ty by mail, as likely t~ be ruinous to the island." 70 
President Roosevelt appointed General Tasker H. Bliss to represent the 
United States in the negotiations which followed. The United States 
offered 20 per cent reduction to the Cubans which was finally accepted, 
and a. treaty was signed on December 11, 1902, which was sent to the 
Senate of this country six days later. After the holidays, Roosevelt 
called an extraordinary session of Congress to consider the reciprocity 
treaty and the question of the isthmian canal. 
It became apparent that "February saw a. marked change in the atti-
tude of the House and the Senate leaders. 1171 There are several reasons to 
account for this, none of them altruistic. The Administration, fearful 
that Cuba. would turn to rival European powers in seeking the markets which 
she needed, began to exert pressure on Republican leaders of the opposition. 
The antagonism between Congress and the Administration threatened a. serious 
breach in the Republican ranks, and there lias danger of a. split in the 
party. "The defection from the 'insurgent t ranks came slowly and gradually, 
72 
but it came. 11 
Another and important reason behind this change of policy was that 
since December 1901, Havemeyer, Thomas, Palmer, and Donner of the American 
Sugar Refining Company, had been appointed to acquire large interests in 
70 Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, 328. 
7l Robinson, ~ !:lli! the Intervention, 286. 
72 ~., 287. 
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the various beet sugar companies of the United States, which they set 
about doing immediately. A chart compiled in later years, in connection 
with a Congressional investigation of the Company as a trust, throws much 




1902 • • • 
1902 ••• 
1902-06 • • 
1902-06 • ,. 
1903 ••• 
purchased one-half of capital stock of Spreckels Sugar (beet) 
Co. of California 
purchased one-half :interest in The Utah-Idaho Sugar Company 
11 11 rr 11 n Amalgamated Sugar Co. 
n $7,5001 000 of capital stock in American Beet Sugar 
made contract with last mentioned company to act as sole agent 
for the disposal of its products. · 
purchased large blocks of stock in 1-fichigan Sugar Company 
11 n u 11 n " Great lrJ'estern Sugar Co. 
made contract with Alameda S~ar Co. similar to that made 
with American Beet Sugar Co.Tj 
A truce l'Tas effected now between the two former rival sugar indus-
tries. "The effect upon the judgment of the country~s legislators was 
surprising~ The delegation from Nichigan • • • where Havemeyer had bought 
the largest company outright, showed a favorable majority for reciprocity 
where it had been unanimously opposed but a year before. 11 74 
The Senate, still cautious, added an amendment to the effect that 
the reduction on Cuban sugar should not be increased beyond 20 per cent 
of the prevailing tariff rate. This was later abrogated :in 1913.75 On 
P~rch 19, 1903,the Senate advised ratification with the provision that it 
be submitted to Congress for approval. Cuban ratification came a few days 
later; The bill was not passed in the House. until the following fall, when 
another article was added providing that as long as the treaty should 
73 House Report 331, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part 11 5-6. 
74 Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, 138. 
75 The Effects of the Cuban Reciprocity Treaty, 28. 
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remain in force no other country could receive tariff rates on sugar 
lower than those provided in the Dingley bill of 1$97. Jealous of their 
prerogative to levy tariffs the House added the following: 
And provided further, that nothing herein contained shall be 
held or construed as an admission on the part of the House 
of Representatives that custom duties can be changed otherwise 
than by an act of Congress originating in said House.76 
Thus amended the bill passed in the House on November 19 by a vote 
of three hundred and thirty-five to twenty-one, and a month later in the 
Senate by seventy-five to eighteen. The President signed it on December 17, 
1903, and according to agreement it became effective ten days later.77 
Reciprocity with the United States proved a great boon to Cuba. In 
its report for 1919 the Tariff Cormnission stated that "Since 1906 Cuban 
sugars have formed more than half the total shipments of sugar into the 
continental United States in every year with but bro exceptions."?$ 
Contrary to the predictions of some 11 •• • domestic beet, domestic cane, 
and territorial cane all increased in the years following the reciprocity 
treaty~u79 
Reciprocity as a policy was tested by the United States in the 
nineteenth century. Its champions, such as James G. Blaine, saw in it a 
powerful weapon to foster good will, especially among the nations of the 
Western hemisphere, through a mutual exchange of those products which each 
76 Congressional Record, 5Sth Congress, 1st Session, 274. 
77 ~ Effects of the Cuban Reciprocity Treaty, 30. 
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could best export. Blaine, and others like him, felt that reciprocity was 
one of the steps leading to what we today call hemisphere solidarity~ Its 
opponents were suspicious of it as interfering with a constitutional right, 
a heritage from English law and custom, that the representatives of the 
people should have the power to levy taxes and to declare from what source 
the revenue of their country should be raised. others opposed it because 
of greed or the fear of competition; some others because of politics~ 
Reciprocity in itself is not a panacea li'hich will remedy the 
economic ills of the world: Frequently, the economic ills of the world 
are not economic in their origin. But, properly employed reciprocity 
might help all the nations of the world to have access to the raw materials 
and to the markets which each needs for sustenance, and thus fulfill one 
of the conditions set down by Pope Pius XII in his Christmas message of 
1939 as necessary for the preservation of world peace. 
-.L.V"fo-
CONCLUSION 
Although united geographically by a chain of' mountains which sweeps 
vertically dmm the western coast of' North America, through Mexico, con-
tinues its jagged way among the Central Americas until it cullninates :in 
the lofty Andes, the continents of' North and South America are separated 
by more than distance~ The culture of' the northern continent became pre-
dominantly Anglo-saxon, while that of' the south is La.tin. In the United 
States the Roman Catholics remain a minority group in spite of' their grow-
:ing numbers, while Roman Catholicism 'is the pr:incipal religion of' the La. tin 
American states. Conn:n.ercially, as well as culturally, the countries of' 
l.Uddle and South America have f'elt more closely bound to Europe than to 
the United States. In point of' distance, especially before the constructi~ 
of' the Panama Canal, ms.ny of' the South American countries vrere actually 
closer to Europe than to the cont:inent north of' them. Other factors which 
hindered the early development of' intimate commercial relations between 
the two continents are to be found in their respective histories: 
The northern continent was settled first in the east, and the open-
ing hundred years of' the United States' history as a nation is occupied 
with the gradual westward movement of' its peoples. As a result, the 
primary economic coneern of' this nation for many years centered around the 
domestic development of the country, in protectin!5 its :infant industries 
from foreign competition, and in supplying the consumer needs of' its own 
citizens. In the meantime, England, who depended on its foreign trade 
for sustenance, and several other nations of Europe, were not slow to 
grasp the opportunities for trade which. the latin American countries 
offered. They established a system of long time credits, and specia~ 
mnufactured articles which proved advantageous :in cementing the commercial 
bonds between Europe and South America: 
later when certain interests in the United States, desirous of 
strengthening the commerce between the two Americas, sought to make 
teciprocity trade agreements, they met with opposition of varying degrees~ 
Although some reciprocity agreements were concluded between the United 
States and her latin American neighbors dur:ing the n:ineteenth century, 
they served principally as experiments and preparations for the more 
successful trade agreements of Franklin Roosevelt~s administrations: 
If we are convinced today of the need of hemispheric solidarity 
in th:ings economic, it is due :in part to the pioneers of the reciprocity 
movement - to Clay, Romero, Blaine, Root, and others, who, more far-
sighted than many of their contemporaries, envisioned the benefits which 
would accrue to all the Americas, through the policy of reciprocal trade. 
agreements: 
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